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Introduction	  
Political	  Economy	  is	  young	  academic	  field	  that	  features	  creative	  combinations	  of	  economics,	  political	  science,	  and	  ecology	  to	  solve	  humankind’s	  oldest	  resource	  problems.	  The	  story	  of	  the	  new	  field’s	  inception	  is	  a	  story	  of	  people.	  Professor	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  and	  Professor	  Garrett	  Hardin	  are	  two	  of	  the	  most	  remarkable	  figures	  of	  Political	  Economy	  They	  revolutionized	  theory	  and	  research	  within	  the	  field	  through	  their	  empirical	  analysis	  as	  much	  as	  their	  unique	  grit,	  background,	  and	  personality.	  Moreover,	  both	  were	  able	  to	  increase	  discussion	  of	  common-­‐pool	  resource	  problems	  through	  very	  different	  means	  and	  within	  very	  different	  communities.	  
	  These	  professors	  address	  the	  world’s	  largest	  questions	  with	  their	  work	  as	  much	  as	  their	  lives.	  Their	  work	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  overpopulation	  potential,	  environmental	  conservation,	  property	  rights	  laws,	  and	  outer	  space	  governance.	  Their	  life	  stories	  illuminate	  gender-­‐biases	  and	  academic	  elitism	  that	  still	  persist	  into	  2016.	  Although	  Hardin	  and	  Ostrom	  were	  commonly	  understood	  to	  be	  in	  competition	  with	  one	  another	  during	  their	  lifetimes,	  both	  agreed	  finding	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  rapidly	  increasingly	  population	  and	  subsequent	  changes	  in	  resource	  management	  was	  vitally	  important	  to	  humankind’s	  future.	  Moreover,	  both	  professors’	  backgrounds,	  Hardin	  in	  Biology	  and	  Ostrom	  in	  Political	  Science,	  create	  the	  differentiation	  necessary	  to	  innovate	  traditional	  ideals.	  Ostrom’s	  story,	  in	  particular,	  illuminates	  a	  pervasive	  and	  abiding	  bias	  against	  women	  advancing	  in	  the	  academic	  community.	  However,	  the	  strength	  of	  her	  ideas	  and	  her	  faith	  in	  the	  process,	  Ostrom’s	  perseverance	  in	  the	  face	  of	  professional	  adversity	  and	  apathy,	  broke	  through.	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The	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons	  Parable	  
The	  story	  of	  the	  tragedy	  of	  the	  commons	  first	  emerged	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  British	  Industrial	  Revolution	  in	  the	  early	  19th	  century.	  The	  rapidly	  growing	  economic	  production	  confronted	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  with	  an	  entirely	  new	  set	  of	  capacity-­‐related	  problems.	  Born	  in	  1794,	  the	  writer	  William	  Forster	  Lloyd	  was	  especially	  cognizant	  of	  this	  unprecedented	  population	  growth,	  spurring	  him	  to	  write	  “Two	  Lectures	  on	  the	  Checks	  to	  Population”	  in	  1833.	  Lloyd	  sought	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  unavoidable	  catastrophe	  that	  individual	  actors	  can	  create	  for	  the	  population	  as	  a	  whole.	  To	  voice	  his	  concerns,	  he	  created	  a	  hypothetical	  story	  centered	  around	  grazing	  cattle	  in	  a	  shared	  pasture.	  
According	  to	  Lloyd,	  a	  pasture	  that	  is	  unowned	  and	  available	  to	  all	  will	  be	  exploited	  without	  the	  presence	  of	  regulation:	  “Each	  [cattle]	  herder’s	  self-­‐interest	  is	  to	  maximize	  his	  use	  of	  the	  commons	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  community	  at	  large”	  (Adler,	  "Property	  Rights	  and	  the	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons").	  With	  the	  addition	  of	  each	  cow,	  a	  herder’s	  potential	  benefit,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  income	  generated	  off	  the	  cow,	  is	  high.	  However,	  “the	  costs	  of	  overgrazing	  the	  pasture	  are	  distributed	  among	  every	  user	  of	  the	  pasture”	  (Adler,	  "Property	  Rights	  and	  the	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons").).	  “In	  an	  enclosed	  pasture,”	  Lloyd	  argues,	  “there	  is	  a	  point	  of	  saturation...	  beyond	  which	  no	  prudent	  man	  would	  add	  to	  his	  stock”	  (Lloyd	  473).	  However,	  because	  the	  pasture	  is	  shared	  in	  common,	  not	  privately	  owned,	  individual	  herders	  will	  not	  heed	  or	  care	  about	  the	  point	  of	  saturation	  as	  their	  addition	  is	  merely	  a	  drop	  in	  a	  bucket.	  Inevitable	  devastation	  for	  all	  herders	  will	  ensue	  when	  the	  pasture	  is	  fatally	  overgrazed,	  the	  inevitability	  making	  the	  situation	  tragic	  by	  definition.	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Labeling	  the	  Features	  of	  Lloyd’s	  Metaphor	  
The	  physical	  land	  in	  Lloyd’s	  metaphor	  is	  a	  “non-­‐excludable	  good”	  in	  this	  instance	  because	  it	  is	  open	  to	  all,	  and,	  as	  Mansfield	  explains,	  “the	  individuals	  who	  make	  no	  contribution	  benefit	  as	  much	  as	  or	  more	  than	  those	  who	  contribute”	  to	  the	  upkeep	  of	  the	  grazing	  field	  (Mansbridge	  591).	  This	  assumes	  the	  individuals	  are	  using	  the	  pasture	  to	  graze	  and	  maintain	  their	  herd	  of	  cattle	  for	  profit.	  These	  exploitive	  non-­‐contributors	  are	  known	  as	  free	  riders.	  In	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  non-­‐excludable	  good,	  a	  “collective	  action	  problem”	  surely	  arises.	  	  There	  are	  three	  possible	  solutions	  to	  a	  collective	  action	  problem.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  privatize	  the	  land,	  a	  method	  often	  advocated	  by	  Prof.	  Garrett	  Hardin.	  Hardin	  believes	  privatizing	  the	  land	  (i.e.	  dividing	  land	  into	  parcels	  and	  granting	  individual	  ownership)	  will	  achieve	  privatization	  of	  environmental	  costs.	  Privatizing	  the	  costs	  eliminates	  the	  problem	  of	  free	  riders,	  in	  theory,	  because	  each	  owner	  will	  be	  the	  sole	  bearer	  of	  destroying	  their	  land	  through	  overgrazing.	  The	  second	  method	  is	  to	  “use	  a	  combination	  of	  socialization,	  guilt,	  religion	  and	  philosophical	  reason	  to	  create	  and	  maintain	  internal	  sanctions	  against	  free-­‐riding”	  (Mansbridge	  591).	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  often	  supports	  methods	  of	  this	  nature.	  She	  believes	  herders	  must	  collectively	  and	  collaboratively	  work	  together	  to	  ensure	  the	  best	  possible	  outcome	  for	  all.	  Thirdly,	  the	  problem	  can	  be	  solved	  through	  “external	  sanction”	  usually	  determined	  by	  a	  higher	  regulatory	  authority.	  The	  specific	  subset	  of	  collective	  action	  problems	  that	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  studies	  involve	  a	  class	  of	  non-­‐excludable	  resources	  called	  “common-­‐pool	  resources.”	  They	  are	  defined	  as	  “resources	  that	  are	  renewable	  and	  are	  present	  in	  situations	  in	  which	  substantial	  scarcity	  presents	  the	  possibility	  that	  users	  may	  substantially	  harm	  one	  another;	  yet	  the	  possibility	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of	  producing	  major	  external	  harm	  is	  foreclosed”	  (Axelrod	  581).	  Examples	  of	  common-­‐pool	  resources	  include	  commercial	  fishing	  waters,	  grazing	  fields,	  water	  resources,	  and	  oil	  reserves,	  among	  many	  others.	  Collective	  action	  problems	  involving	  common-­‐pool	  resources	  have	  increased	  in	  importance	  given	  the	  ever-­‐expanding	  resource	  demand	  needed	  to	  sustain	  an	  enormous	  human	  population	  of	  planet	  earth.	  Moreover,	  the	  ability	  to	  study	  these	  problems	  has	  substantially	  increased	  since	  the	  1950s,	  due	  largely	  in	  part	  to	  game	  theory.	  Game	  theory	  is	  “the	  study	  of	  mathematical	  models	  of	  conflict	  and	  cooperation	  between	  intelligent	  rational	  decision-­‐makers"	  (Myerson	  1).	  This	  analysis	  assumes	  human	  actors	  will	  choose	  a	  given	  course	  of	  action	  in	  respect	  to	  what	  they	  feel	  their	  counterpart,	  or	  opponent,	  will	  do.	  William	  Forster	  Lloyd’s	  essay	  proves	  that	  the	  fundamental	  components	  of	  game	  theory	  have	  certainly	  been	  at	  least	  subconsciously	  or	  inherently	  understood	  well	  before	  the	  1950s.	  However,	  as	  Harvard	  policy	  professor	  Jane	  Mansbridge	  notes,	  before	  game	  theorists	  “we	  did	  not	  have	  the	  intellectual	  tools	  to	  single	  out	  as	  analytically	  central	  the	  fact	  that	  certain	  goods	  have	  an	  intrinsic	  character	  such	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  or	  highly	  costly	  to	  exclude	  non-­‐contributors	  from	  their	  benefits”	  (Mansbridge	  591).	  Game	  theory	  mathematically	  proved	  the	  existence	  of	  free	  riders	  and,	  thus	  allowed	  academics	  such	  as	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  to	  safely	  operate	  upon	  these	  assumptions.	  	  Academics	  have	  long	  been	  pessimistic	  of	  trusting	  findings	  claiming	  to	  solve	  collective	  action	  problems.	  As	  Professor	  Jane	  Mansbridge	  laments,	  “there	  is	  an	  inbuilt	  trajectory	  to	  failure	  in	  collective	  action”	  (Mansbridge	  590).	  Debate	  continues	  to	  rage	  as	  to	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  best	  of	  the	  three	  aforementioned	  methods.	  However,	  most	  interested	  parties	  would	  agree	  that	  solving	  collective	  action	  problems	  “is	  certainly	  the	  most	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important	  problem	  of	  our	  time.	  It	  shapes	  the	  dynamics	  of	  global	  warming,	  the	  environment	  generally,	  nuclear	  proliferation,	  taxes,	  health	  care	  provision,	  and	  most	  other	  issues	  for	  which	  human	  beings	  have	  devised	  (or	  failed	  to	  devise)	  public	  governing	  systems“	  (Mansbridge	  590).	  	  William	  Lloyd	  was	  well	  before	  his	  time	  in	  identifying	  this	  instance	  of	  game	  theory	  analysis.	  However,	  his	  greatest	  contribution	  to	  academics	  remains	  originating	  the	  concept	  of	  “commons”	  within	  the	  political,	  economic,	  and	  ecological	  contexts.	  While	  he	  failed	  to	  specify	  constituent	  qualities	  needed	  to	  define	  the	  commons	  fully,	  many	  have	  since	  assumed	  the	  mantle.	  The	  commons	  has	  become	  a	  buzzword	  in	  academics.	  Multiple	  academic	  disciplines	  use	  the	  word	  with	  interminable	  definitions	  and	  variances.	  However,	  one	  man	  is	  often	  credited	  with	  its	  modern	  proliferation	  and	  that	  man	  is	  not	  William	  Forster	  Lloyd.	  That	  man	  is	  Professor	  Garrett	  Hardin.	  	  
Garrett	  Hardin	  
Born	  in	  1915,	  Garrett	  Hardin	  experienced	  his	  adolescence	  and	  early	  adulthood	  amidst	  the	  trying	  years	  of	  the	  Great	  Depression.	  Nonetheless,	  Hardin	  received	  an	  incredible	  education	  by	  today’s	  standards,	  attending	  University	  of	  Chicago	  for	  his	  undergraduate	  degree	  in	  zoology	  and	  Stanford	  for	  his	  microbiology	  Ph.D.	  Hardin	  applied	  this	  education	  immediately	  by	  joining	  the	  Carnegie	  Institute,	  cultivating	  algae	  for	  use	  in	  food.	  However,	  it	  appears	  that	  Hardin	  was	  unsatisfied	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  his	  research.	  As	  Prof.	  Carl	  J.	  Bajema	  conveys,	  “[Garrett’s]	  heart	  was	  not	  in	  the	  business	  of	  trying	  to	  just	  temporarily	  solve	  population	  problems	  by	  increasing	  supplies”	  (Bajema	  195).	  Distrust	  of	  creating	  artificial	  additions	  to	  a	  resource	  pool,	  such	  as	  food	  resources	  through	  algae	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cultivation,	  would	  later	  prove	  to	  be	  foundational	  in	  Hardin’s	  ecological	  writing.	  For	  now,	  it	  would	  serve	  as	  reason	  enough	  to	  change	  his	  career	  trajectory.	  In	  1946,	  Hardin	  left	  the	  Carnegie	  Institute	  to	  assume	  a	  teaching	  role	  in	  the	  biology	  department	  of	  the	  University	  of	  California	  at	  Santa	  Barbara.	  As	  a	  strong	  advocate	  of	  the	  Socratic	  teaching	  method,	  Hardin	  sought	  to	  revolutionize	  the	  way	  by	  which	  his	  students	  approached	  the	  notoriously	  dense	  topic	  of	  biology.	  He	  took	  quickly	  to	  his	  new	  role	  as	  educator,	  publishing	  a	  textbook,	  Biology:	  Its	  Human	  Implication	  in	  1949.	  This	  textbook,	  according	  to	  Bajema,	  “broke	  new	  ground	  by	  presenting	  biology	  through	  the	  teaching	  of	  the	  scientific	  method”	  (Bajema	  195).	  Hardin	  won	  praise	  for	  his	  ability	  to	  communicate	  the	  vast	  amount	  of	  material	  with	  order	  and	  cohesion.	  His	  attention	  to	  clear	  communication	  was	  predicated	  on	  his	  opinion	  that	  “language	  could	  be	  used	  to	  prevent	  thought	  as	  much	  as	  it	  can	  be	  used	  to	  encourage	  thought”	  (Leeper	  785).	  Hardin	  concluded	  that	  a	  mastery	  of	  writing	  skills	  could	  further	  nullify	  “the	  literacy	  filter”	  which	  he	  describes	  as	  people’s	  “ability	  to	  understand	  what	  words	  really	  mean”	  (Bajema	  196).	  	  Throughout	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s,	  Hardin	  continued	  to	  play	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  creating	  biology	  curriculum	  for	  secondary	  levels	  of	  education.	  In	  1960,	  he	  was	  appointed	  to	  the	  Board	  of	  Directors	  of	  the	  Biological	  Sciences	  Curriculum	  Study.	  Considering	  his	  academic	  pedigree,	  experience	  in	  applied	  research,	  in-­‐class	  teaching	  and	  success	  in	  textbook	  authorship,	  Hardin	  seemed	  poised	  to	  join	  the	  next	  generation	  of	  trailblazers	  in	  extending	  the	  great	  legacy	  of	  American	  biological	  sciences.	  How,	  then,	  would	  Garrett	  Hardin	  later	  become	  known	  as	  “the	  bad	  boy	  of	  biology”?	  How,	  then,	  would	  Hardin	  become	  most	  widely	  read	  by	  economists	  and	  political	  scientists?	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Hardin	  appears	  to	  have	  engaged	  in	  a	  tremendous	  amount	  of	  independent	  reading	  and	  research	  in	  the	  field	  of	  ecology,	  a	  hobby	  that	  would	  ultimately	  cannibalize	  his	  attention	  to	  microbiology.	  He	  had	  a	  particular	  affinity	  for	  pondering	  questions	  of	  population	  growth	  and	  population	  thresholds,	  an	  obsession	  that	  first	  bloomed	  while	  attending	  the	  University	  of	  Chicago.	  To	  Hardin,	  the	  study	  of	  ecology	  represented	  the	  academic	  vehicle	  through	  which	  he	  could	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  what	  he	  considered	  to	  be	  humankind’s	  greatest	  issue—the	  population	  problem.	  Overpopulation	  and	  measures	  prohibiting	  further	  degradation	  of	  environmental	  resources	  consumed	  his	  research.	  Ecology	  was	  part	  biology,	  part	  geography,	  and	  part	  economics.	  Ecology	  allowed	  Hardin	  to	  exercise	  his	  inner	  philosopher	  in	  conjunction	  with	  his	  honed	  abilities	  as	  a	  disciplined	  man	  of	  biological	  science.	  This	  hybrid	  academic	  self-­‐image	  satiated	  Hardin’s	  appetite	  for	  addressing	  the	  root	  of	  the	  resource	  issue	  he	  felt	  so	  discontented	  with	  at	  the	  Carnegie	  Institute.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  his	  death,	  Hardin	  had	  published	  27	  books	  and	  350	  articles,	  writing	  extensively	  in	  the	  field	  of	  ecology.	  Garrett	  Hardin	  and	  his	  wife,	  Jane,	  died	  in	  2003,	  at	  88	  and	  81,	  electing	  to	  take	  their	  own	  lives	  in	  lieu	  of	  succumbing	  naturally	  to	  their	  accumulating	  ailments.	  This	  decision	  to	  take	  their	  own	  lives	  signifies	  Garrett	  Hardin’s	  ultimate	  conviction	  in	  his	  beliefs	  and	  his	  flair	  for	  the	  unusual.	  He	  did	  not	  believe	  more	  resources	  should	  be	  expended	  keeping	  him	  alive.	  This	  consistency	  was	  noted	  by	  many:	  “friends	  say	  the	  Hardins	  practiced	  what	  they	  preached	  by	  collecting	  rainwater	  to	  drink,	  recycling,	  composting,	  and	  eschewing	  newspapers	  because	  they	  squander	  newsprint”	  (Holden	  1).	  Although	  Hardin	  studied	  microbiology	  and	  wrote	  within	  ecological	  contexts,	  his	  works	  are	  referenced	  extensively	  within	  policy	  analysis,	  economic	  theory,	  governance	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theory,	  and	  a	  myriad	  of	  other	  fields.	  He	  died	  a	  heavily	  debated	  author	  known	  for	  igniting	  fresh	  dialogue	  on	  topics	  surrounding	  human	  resource	  management.	  	  Although	  Hardin	  appears	  to	  have	  accomplished	  an	  incredible	  amount	  in	  one	  lifetime,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  his	  work	  had	  a	  detrimental	  effect	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  Elinor	  Ostrom,	  albeit	  unintentional.	  Hardin’s	  determination	  to	  say	  “what	  words	  really	  mean”	  actually	  led	  him	  to	  say	  and	  claim	  truly	  obnoxious,	  objectionable,	  and	  detestable	  things.	  His	  readership,	  consisting	  primarily	  of	  ecologists	  or	  academics	  in	  social	  science	  fields,	  was	  highly	  critical.	  This	  is	  especially	  important	  given	  that	  he	  was	  the	  primary	  instigator	  of	  discussion	  of	  or	  relating	  to	  “the	  commons.”	  A	  deeper	  examination	  of	  his	  writing,	  particularly	  his	  essay	  “The	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons,”	  will	  yield	  a	  negative	  outlook	  on	  his	  foray	  into	  political	  economy.	  	  
The	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons,	  1968	  
Hardin’s	  interest	  in	  ecology	  officially	  surfaced	  in	  his	  now-­‐famous	  article	  “The	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons,”	  published	  Science	  in	  December	  of	  1968.	  The	  essay	  became	  his	  coat	  of	  arms	  and	  would	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  his	  extensive	  publishing	  history.	  In	  the	  essay,	  Hardin	  employs	  William	  Forster	  Lloyd’s	  metaphor	  of	  the	  cattle-­‐grazing	  field	  with	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  his	  own	  embellishment.	  As	  of	  1968,	  Lloyd’s	  metaphor	  was	  relatively	  unknown	  in	  the	  modern	  American	  ecological	  and	  economic	  circles	  and	  Hardin	  appropriated	  the	  story	  to	  propagate	  his	  ultimate	  conclusion	  -­‐	  the	  inevitability	  of	  humankind’s	  tragic	  and	  destructive	  use	  of	  resources.	  The	  essay	  is	  unique	  not	  only	  in	  its	  conclusions	  on	  resource	  management,	  but	  also	  in	  its	  writing	  style.	  The	  6-­‐page	  essay	  became	  instantly	  controversial	  and	  gained	  notoriety	  quickly.	  The	  dramatic	  way	  in	  which	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Hardin	  makes	  his	  points	  was	  objectively	  different	  in	  its	  orientation	  than	  many	  other	  academic	  papers	  concerning	  population.	  	  Hardin’s	  writing	  carries	  with	  it	  an	  air	  of	  confidence	  and	  a	  tone	  of	  reproach.	  He	  believes	  his	  scientific	  background	  allows	  him	  to	  more	  clearly	  understand	  the	  population	  problem.	  Moreover,	  he	  believes	  he	  is	  unabashedly	  realistic,	  as	  he	  asserts	  “most	  people	  who	  anguish	  over	  the	  population	  problem	  are	  trying	  to	  find	  a	  way	  to	  avoid	  the	  evils	  of	  overpopulation	  without	  relinquishing	  any	  of	  the	  privileges	  they	  now	  enjoy”	  (Hardin	  1).	  He	  considers	  himself	  grounded	  and	  realistic,	  willing	  to	  face	  problems	  others	  are	  too	  scared	  to	  tackle.	  He	  considers	  “them”	  to	  be	  childish	  in	  their	  optimism,	  seeking	  to	  insulate	  their	  comfortable	  world	  from	  reproach.	  Hardin’s	  tone	  in	  his	  writing	  seems	  to	  be	  aware	  that	  he	  published	  about	  the	  literacy	  filter.	  He	  refuses	  to	  soften	  the	  truth.	  A	  pillar	  of	  his	  attitude	  is	  his	  acceptance	  that	  “the	  population	  problem	  has	  no	  technical	  solution,”	  something	  he	  presumes	  others	  researching	  the	  same	  issue	  are	  unable	  to	  recognize	  due	  to	  their	  weak	  conviction	  (Hardin	  1).	  His	  arguments,	  moreover,	  carry	  vestiges	  of	  his	  past	  work,	  a	  key	  differentiator	  between	  him	  and	  other	  academics.	  He	  says,	  “they	  think	  that	  farming	  the	  seas	  or	  developing	  new	  strains	  of	  wheat	  will	  solve	  the	  problem-­‐-­‐technologically,”	  in	  reference	  to	  his	  former	  job	  at	  the	  Carnegie	  Institute	  (Hardin	  1).	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  Hardin’s	  publication	  in	  the	  late	  1960s,	  early	  1970s,	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  world	  could	  become	  overpopulated	  was	  trivial.	  Overpopulation	  was	  never	  featured	  on	  nightly	  news	  nor	  was	  it	  front	  of	  mind	  for	  average,	  resource-­‐consuming	  individuals.	  This	  infuriated	  Prof.	  Hardin.	  While	  he	  was	  encouraged	  by	  the	  American	  public’s	  peaking	  interest	  into	  environmental	  protection,	  he	  believed	  the	  most	  dangerous	  issue	  had	  been	  lost.	  	  Hardin	  himself	  mused	  that	  he	  saw	  “less	  [bright	  spots]	  with	  respect	  to	  population	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than	  [he	  does]	  with	  the	  environment”	  because,	  in	  his	  opinion,	  a	  prerequisite	  to	  understanding	  overpopulation	  as	  a	  problem	  “is	  a	  recognition	  that	  we’ll	  have	  to	  limit	  personal	  liberties”	  (Leeper	  786).	  	  At	  times,	  the	  swirling	  controversy	  around	  Hardin	  appears	  rooted	  more	  in	  Hardin’s	  sources	  than	  his	  conclusions.	  In	  addition	  to	  his	  own	  theories,	  Hardin	  relied	  on	  those	  of	  the	  19th-­‐century,	  British	  Industrial	  Revolution-­‐era	  philosopher,	  Thomas	  Robert	  Malthus.	  Malthus,	  the	  creator	  of	  the	  famous	  Malthusian	  Theory	  and	  Malthusian	  Catastrophe,	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  most	  heavily	  criticized	  theorists	  in	  the	  last	  200	  years.	  Malthusian	  Catastrophe	  is	  the	  general	  belief	  that	  human	  reproduction	  will	  increase	  at	  a	  rate	  exponentially	  faster	  than	  our	  resources,	  ultimately	  causing	  a	  massive	  drop	  in	  population.	  Unlike	  Lloyd,	  Malthus	  had	  received	  considerable	  attention	  for	  his	  work	  during	  his	  lifetime.	  Malthus	  posthumously	  became	  a	  popular	  punching	  bag	  of	  20th-­‐	  and	  21st-­‐century	  political	  economy,	  as	  many	  believed	  he	  had	  been	  irrevocably	  disproven	  and	  replaced	  by	  study	  of	  game	  theory.	  His	  conclusions	  served	  as	  an	  amplifier	  of	  an	  industrialized	  and	  vigorously	  expanding	  generation’s	  new	  found	  worries	  of	  the	  scale	  and	  possibilities	  of	  natural	  resource	  destruction.	  Hardin	  was	  not	  shy	  of	  adopting	  Malthus’s	  logic	  despite	  his	  awareness	  of	  Malthus’s	  reputation.	  	  As	  economist	  Klaus	  Hofmann	  corroborates,	  “from	  early	  on	  Malthus’s	  construct	  has	  been	  deemed	  untenable”	  (Hofmann	  1).	  However,	  Hardin	  understood	  that	  much	  had	  changed	  since	  1798	  when	  Malthus	  published	  “An	  Essay	  of	  the	  Principle	  of	  Population.”	  	  Firstly,	  the	  accuracy	  by	  which	  humankind	  measured	  world	  population	  had	  substantially	  improved.	  Hardin	  had	  access	  to	  relatively	  precise	  predictions	  of	  population	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change.	  From	  the	  time	  Thomas	  Malthus	  published	  his	  essay	  to	  the	  time	  Garrett	  Hardin	  published	  “The	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons,”	  the	  population	  had	  grown	  from	  an	  estimated	  one	  billion	  people	  to	  nearly	  four	  billion	  people	  (UN	  Dept.	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Affairs,	  1999).	  Moreover,	  the	  underlying	  capitalist	  economic	  system	  that	  enabled	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution	  had	  proliferated	  globally	  in	  that	  span	  of	  time.	  While	  crediting	  world	  population	  increase	  directly	  to	  a	  single	  factor,	  such	  as	  globalized	  trade,	  is	  a	  difficult	  and	  fruitless	  endeavor,	  the	  correlation	  is	  substantial.	  This	  is	  the	  same	  economic	  system	  that	  had	  worried	  Malthus	  and	  Lloyd,	  only	  much	  larger.	  Hardin	  liked	  referencing	  facts	  such	  as	  there	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  a	  time	  since	  the	  1800s	  where	  world	  population	  reached	  equilibrium	  (i.e.	  the	  net	  difference	  between	  the	  birth	  rate	  and	  death	  rate	  equals	  zero).	  Moreover,	  world	  population	  has	  yet	  to	  decline.	  In	  Hardin’s	  mind,	  and	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  many	  observers,	  examining	  possibilities	  of	  overpopulation	  become	  more	  relevant	  with	  every	  day	  that	  passes.	  At	  the	  time	  that	  both	  Thomas	  Robert	  Malthus	  and	  Garrett	  Hardin	  published	  their	  aforementioned	  essays,	  the	  question	  of	  overpopulation	  was	  never	  more	  relevant.	  	  
Malthus’s	  writing	  style	  incorporated	  Malthus	  provided	  more	  to	  Hardin	  than	  merely	  a	  timeliness	  component;	  he	  also	  engendered	  a	  flair	  for	  dramatic	  in	  Hardin’s	  writing	  style.	  Malthus’s	  writing	  style	  was	  candid,	  pessimistic,	  and	  dramatic.	  For	  instance,	  Malthus	  indicated	  that	  in	  the	  event	  that	  many	  man-­‐made	  population	  limiters,	  such	  as	  “war	  of	  extermination,	  sickly	  seasons,	  epidemics,	  pestilence,	  and	  plague,”	  were	  to	  “advance	  in	  terrific	  array	  and	  sweep	  off	  their	  thousands	  and	  tens	  of	  thousands”	  the	  limiters	  would	  still	  fail	  to	  successfully	  limit	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population	  to	  a	  sustainable	  level.	  “Should	  [these	  limiters’]	  success	  be	  still	  incomplete,	  gigantic	  inevitable	  famine	  stalks	  in	  the	  rear,	  and	  with	  one	  mighty	  blow	  levels	  the	  population	  with	  the	  food	  of	  the	  world”	  (Malthus	  2).	  	  This	  powerful	  language	  served	  the	  purpose	  of	  animating	  catastrophe	  for	  the	  reader,	  a	  quality	  of	  Malthus’s	  writing	  that	  clearly	  impacted	  Garrett	  Hardin.	  Indeed,	  Hardin’s	  work	  carries	  similar	  tone,	  as	  he	  spoke	  of	  the	  need	  to	  “exorcise	  the	  spirit	  of	  Adam	  Smith,”	  posited	  that	  “freedom	  in	  a	  commons	  brings	  ruin	  to	  all,”	  and	  remarked	  that	  “ruin	  is	  the	  destination	  toward	  which	  all	  men	  rush,	  each	  pursuing	  his	  own	  best	  interest”	  (Hardin	  1244).	  He	  made	  sure	  to	  define	  “tragedy”	  as	  “the	  solemnity	  of	  the	  remorseless	  working	  of	  things”	  echoing	  Malthus’s	  own	  language,	  that	  often	  spoke	  of	  “moral	  restraint,	  vice	  and	  misery”	  (Malthus).	  	  
Malthus’s	  argument	  simplified	  These	  arguments	  recognize	  two	  opposing	  powers	  existing	  to	  check	  one	  another:	  the	  power	  of	  nature	  and	  the	  power	  of	  population.	  The	  more	  available	  food,	  the	  more	  a	  population	  can	  grow.	  However,	  Malthus’s	  conclusions	  devolve	  quickly,	  and	  his	  message	  proclaims	  an	  inevitable	  human	  experience	  of	  pain	  and	  suffering	  due	  to	  shared	  costs	  of	  commons	  destruction.	  This	  argument	  is	  twofold:	  first	  by	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  people,	  there	  are	  more	  potential	  people	  to	  feel	  pain,	  suffering,	  and	  hunger.	  Secondly,	  the	  increase	  in	  population	  stretches	  resources	  towards	  a	  resource	  breaking	  point.	  This	  conclusion	  of	  ruin	  would	  become	  known	  as	  the	  Malthusian	  catastrophe.	  	  	  
Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons	  Reception	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“The	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons”	  received	  considerable	  attention	  from	  a	  myriad	  of	  different	  academic	  disciplines,	  chiefly	  within	  policy	  and	  economy	  circles,	  despite	  being	  published	  in	  the	  journal	  Science	  by	  a	  microbiologist.	  This	  attention	  was	  due	  in	  large	  part	  to	  his	  article’s	  controversial	  nature.	  Hardin	  believes	  that	  humans	  are	  “trapped”	  in	  a	  scenario	  where	  they	  will	  inevitably	  bring	  about	  their	  ruin.	  The	  trap	  that	  Hardin	  believes	  humanity	  is	  ensnared	  in	  is	  often	  criticized.	  Moreover,	  his	  inability	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  rational	  problem	  solving	  capabilities	  of	  individual	  humans	  frustrated	  many	  in	  the	  field	  of	  economics.	  Especially	  infuriating	  was	  his	  tone,	  which	  is	  encapsulated	  by	  one	  of	  his	  proponents	  Prof.	  Carl	  Jay	  Bajema	  who	  explains	  “there	  are	  those	  shallow	  thinking	  optimists	  who	  merely	  extrapolate	  desirable	  trends	  (making	  some	  trends	  desirable	  by	  choosing	  the	  ‘appropriate’	  time	  frame)	  or	  contend	  that	  since	  humans	  have	  time	  and	  again	  proven	  their	  resourcefulness,	  they	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  produce	  a	  technical	  fix	  that	  will	  solve	  every	  human	  problem”	  (Bajema	  208).	  	  	  
Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons	  -­‐	  Rejuvenating	  the	  “Commons”	  “The	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons”	  rejuvenated	  discussion	  of	  the	  ideas	  produced	  by	  Malthus,	  Lloyd,	  and	  many	  other	  thinkers	  considered	  taboo	  by	  modern	  standards.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  essay	  thrust	  “the	  commons”	  into	  the	  academic	  spotlight	  as	  a	  mode	  to	  discuss	  variables	  and	  quantities	  in	  political	  economics.	  	  As	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  stated	  in	  2007,	  “Prior	  to	  the	  publication	  of	  [Garrett]	  Hardin’s	  article	  on	  the	  ‘Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons’	  (1968),	  titles	  containing	  the	  words	  'the	  commons,'	  'common	  pool	  resources,'	  or	  'common	  property'	  were	  very	  rare	  in	  the	  academic	  literature"	  (Ostrom	  ).	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Hardin	  paid	  attention	  to	  promoting	  “the	  commons”	  insofar	  as	  it	  served	  a	  functional	  benefit	  to	  his	  argument.	  His	  arguments	  were	  predicated	  on	  his	  underlying	  belief	  that	  with	  every	  passing	  day,	  with	  every	  birth,	  the	  world	  population	  grew	  one	  step	  closer	  to	  its	  demise.	  By	  treating	  the	  entire	  world’s	  resources	  as	  the	  commons	  and	  employing	  William	  Forster	  Lloyd’s	  cattle	  herding	  metaphor,	  he	  explored	  and	  dispatched	  many	  possible	  “technical	  solutions”	  to	  overpopulation.	  He	  ultimately	  arrived	  at	  his	  now-­‐famous	  conclusion	  that	  “that	  the	  population	  has	  no	  technical	  solution,	  it	  requires	  a	  fundamental	  extension	  in	  morality”	  (Hardin,	  1).	  	  At	  six	  pages,	  Hardin’s	  essay	  was	  incredibly	  brief	  considering	  the	  ambitious	  nature	  of	  his	  assertions.	  In	  this	  way,	  many	  different	  individual	  constituent	  arguments	  within	  his	  greater	  solution	  drew	  specific	  criticism	  mostly	  due	  to	  their	  brevity.	  For	  example,	  many	  critics	  took	  issue	  with	  his	  assumptions	  concerning	  the	  inevitability	  of	  human	  population	  surpassing	  its	  ability	  to	  feed	  itself.	  Hardin	  fails	  to	  use	  game	  theory	  or	  modeling	  to	  show	  his	  logic.	  Instead,	  he	  insists	  that	  proving	  the	  inquiry	  at	  a	  modeling	  level	  is	  futile,	  saying	  “the	  commons	  is	  justifiable	  only	  under	  conditions	  of	  low-­‐population	  density”	  (Hardin	  1248).	  Although	  his	  writing	  style	  carried	  with	  it	  little	  evidence	  or	  citation,	  his	  writing	  style	  carried	  confidence.	  Professor	  Hardin	  was	  masterful	  in	  creating	  the	  “impression	  that	  his	  thesis	  had	  a	  solid	  foundation	  in	  history”	  when	  in	  reality,	  “historians	  actually	  paid	  little	  attention	  to	  it”	  (Radkau	  71).	  This	  was	  especially	  dangerous	  given	  that	  “outside	  the	  historical	  profession	  [‘Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons’]	  was	  often	  treated	  as	  proven	  fact”	  (Radkau	  71).	  	  
Non-­‐technical	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The	  nature	  of	  Hardin’s	  non-­‐technical	  solution,	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  perplexed	  onlookers	  who	  considered	  Hardin	  to	  be	  a	  man	  who	  strictly	  adhered	  to	  scientific	  method.	  While	  this	  style	  continued	  to	  be	  a	  consistent	  feature	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  Hardin’s	  writing,	  it	  would	  remain	  tagged	  to	  the	  study	  of	  the	  commons	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Hardin’s	  personality,	  when	  combined	  with	  these	  atypical	  interests,	  bred	  a	  unique	  blend	  of	  academic	  literature.	  Hardin	  felt	  his	  reputation	  as	  “the	  bad	  boy	  of	  biology”	  was	  a	  product	  of	  his	  willingness	  to	  say	  what	  other	  scientists	  were	  too	  scared	  to	  say.	  Coupled	  with	  his	  unwillingness	  to	  mince	  words,	  this	  cavalier	  attitude	  lent	  itself	  to	  many	  reputations	  over	  the	  course	  of	  his	  life.	  In	  an	  interview	  in	  1976,	  Hardin	  said,	  “the	  message	  I	  have	  is	  a	  thing	  that	  many	  people	  are	  thinking,	  but	  they	  don’t	  want	  to	  say”	  (Leeper	  786).	  That	  message	  would	  be	  encompassed	  in	  his	  controversial	  essay	  entitled	  “The	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons”	  (1968).	  	  Although	  his	  behavior	  and	  message	  drew	  heavy	  criticism,	  he	  remains	  a	  founding	  father	  of	  an	  enormously	  important	  academic	  discussion-­‐-­‐that	  of	  common	  pool	  resources.	  As	  Prof.	  Schultz	  explains,	  “Hardin's	  arguments	  inspired	  a	  generation	  of	  social	  scientists	  to	  examine	  various	  forms	  of	  commons	  dilemmas”	  (Shultz	  1).	  While	  Hardin	  should	  be	  commended	  for	  his	  effect	  as	  a	  ecology	  discussion	  catalyst,	  his	  work’s	  reputation	  polluted	  the	  new	  waters	  of	  economic	  analysis	  of	  the	  commons.	  To	  many,	  “The	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons”	  highlighted	  the	  despicable,	  wasteful,	  and	  deadly	  quality	  of	  humankind’s	  excess	  and	  greed,	  only	  this	  time	  delivered	  in	  a	  powerful,	  educated	  tone.	  Having	  been	  published	  in	  1968,	  many	  saw	  his	  conclusion	  that	  “only	  selfishness	  can	  protect	  resources”	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  “the	  anarcho-­‐socialism	  of	  the	  sixties”	  (Radkau	  71).	  Simultaneously,	  many	  economists	  understood	  Hardin	  to	  be	  a	  defender	  of	  land	  privatization	  and	  of	  “clear	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property	  laws	  –	  be	  they	  individual	  or	  state	  laws	  –	  are	  necessary	  everywhere”	  (Radkau	  71).	  Elinor	  Ostrom,	  who	  argued	  for	  a	  mix	  of	  both	  public	  and	  private	  land,	  would	  later	  dispatch	  his	  call	  for	  universal	  privatization	  of	  land.	  However,	  it	  was	  primarily	  Hardin	  that	  soured	  the	  appetite	  for	  Ostrom’s	  later,	  greater	  work.	  	  
Elinor	  ‘Lin’	  Ostrom	  
From	  beginning	  to	  end,	  Ostrom’s	  academic	  journey	  differed	  from	  most	  economic	  Nobel	  Prize	  winners.	  Firstly,	  she	  was	  a	  woman.	  Secondly,	  her	  academic	  research	  began	  with	  fieldwork,	  measuring	  allocation	  of	  water	  resources	  in	  the	  greater	  Los	  Angeles	  area.	  There	  she	  began	  a	  lifelong	  interest	  in	  understanding	  how	  humans	  construct	  and	  manage	  the	  means	  by	  which	  they	  extract	  resources	  not	  in	  theory,	  but	  in	  practice.	  Later,	  she	  focused	  her	  energies	  toward	  excavating	  useful	  economic	  governance	  information	  from	  a	  wealth	  of	  primary-­‐sourced	  works	  previously	  unreferenced	  within	  economics	  papers.	  To	  do	  so,	  she	  created	  a	  new	  “filing	  system,”	  called	  the	  Institutional	  and	  Developmental	  Analysis	  framework	  (IAD).	  This	  framework	  allowed	  Ostrom’s	  research	  assistants	  to	  glean	  empirical	  economic	  and	  managerial	  data	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  published	  academic	  research.	  From	  the	  ever-­‐accumulating	  data,	  Ostrom	  deduced	  her	  not-­‐famous-­‐enough	  theories,	  which	  she	  presented	  in	  her	  Nobel-­‐awarded	  book	  Governing	  the	  Commons.	  	  Ostrom’s	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  work	  changed	  the	  landscape	  of	  resource	  management	  research.	  The	  Workshop	  of	  Political	  Theory	  and	  Policy	  Analysis	  at	  Indiana	  University,	  founded	  by	  Ostrom	  and	  her	  husband,	  Vincent,	  in	  1973,	  continues	  to	  develop	  and	  promote	  	  her	  ideas	  on	  managing	  the	  world’s	  resources.	  Ostrom’s	  work	  ultimately	  earned	  her	  the	  2009	  Nobel	  Prize	  in	  Economics,	  making	  her	  the	  first	  female	  to	  be	  awarded	  the	  prize.	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While	  Lin	  Ostrom’s	  focus	  was	  primarily	  on	  local	  entities,	  her	  work	  can	  and	  should	  be	  used	  in	  examination	  of	  world	  politics.	  Ostrom’s	  obstacles	  did	  not	  entirely	  arise	  from	  academic	  burden	  of	  proof.	  Ostrom’s	  trail	  to	  success	  encountered	  many	  gender-­‐related	  encumbrances.	  Moreover,	  her	  area	  of	  focus,	  the	  commons,	  had	  been	  muddied	  to	  the	  point	  of	  academic	  triviality	  by	  a	  number	  of	  American	  ecologists	  in	  the	  1950s,	  60s,	  and	  70s.	  These	  professors,	  foremost	  among	  them,	  Garrett	  Hardin,	  had	  controlled	  much	  of	  the	  economic	  resource	  management	  discourse	  despite	  having	  never	  been	  formally	  educated	  in	  economics	  or	  political	  science.	  Hardin	  had	  no	  mention	  of	  fieldwork,	  no	  background	  in	  social	  sciences,	  and	  no	  intention	  to	  involve	  stringent	  research	  method	  beyond	  reading	  19th-­‐century	  ecologists.	  Thus,	  publishing	  about	  the	  commons,	  especially	  to	  Ostrom’s	  academic	  peers,	  appeared	  frivolous	  and	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  traditional	  economic	  world.	  Ostrom	  overcame	  these,	  and	  many	  other	  obstacles,	  to	  ultimately	  begin	  the	  process	  of	  formulating	  a	  realistic	  understanding	  of	  best	  resource	  management	  practices.	  Even	  after	  her	  passing	  in	  2012,	  Ostrom	  continues	  represent	  the	  cutting	  edge	  in	  Economic	  research	  through	  her	  framework,	  fieldwork,	  and	  legacy.	  Examination	  of	  her	  most	  famous	  work,	  Governing	  the	  Commons,	  leads	  to	  greatest	  understanding	  Lin	  Ostrom’s	  successes	  and	  trials,	  method	  and	  reception,	  and	  life	  and	  personality.	  Firstly,	  her	  many	  other	  works	  are	  extensively	  referenced	  within	  the	  book.	  Moreover,	  she	  provides	  the	  reader	  with	  a	  substantial	  amount	  of	  meta-­‐commentary	  into	  her	  life	  and	  work.	  Furthermore,	  her	  book,	  rather	  than	  she,	  herself,	  is	  most	  often	  critiqued.	  Direct	  comments	  concerning	  Ostrom	  herself	  abound,	  but	  as	  subtext	  within	  reviews	  of	  her	  actual	  work.	  	  
	   20	  
Attempts	  to	  distill	  Ostrom’s	  end	  goal,	  her	  fundamental	  academic	  purpose,	  are	  plentiful.	  As	  a	  general	  principle,	  Prof.	  Jane	  Mansbridge	  writes	  “Elinor	  Ostrom	  has	  spent	  her	  life	  figuring	  out	  how,	  over	  the	  centuries,	  human	  beings	  have	  managed	  to	  prevent	  tragic	  outcomes	  when	  a	  non-­‐excludable	  good	  produces	  a	  collective	  action	  (or	  "free-­‐rider")	  problem”	  (Mansbridge	  590).	  Frank	  R.	  Baumgartner1	  assumes	  this	  political-­‐economy	  context	  to	  Ostrom	  work,	  focusing	  more	  on	  finding	  Ostrom’s	  mantra.	  “There	  is	  no	  single	  route,	  and	  implementation	  matters,“	  he	  says,	  calling	  her	  method	  “observation,	  observation,	  observation”	  (Baumgartner	  576).	  What	  Prof.	  Baumgartner	  communicates	  is	  Lin	  Ostrom’s	  unique	  and	  ingenious	  use	  of	  a	  combination	  of	  research	  practices.	  By	  combining	  case	  study,	  contextual	  understanding,	  secondary	  research,	  and	  decision	  modeling,	  Ostrom	  takes	  “an	  evenhanded	  approach”	  (Baumgartner).	  	  This	  “evenhanded	  approach”	  is	  commended	  many	  times	  over.	  However,	  it	  is	  open	  to	  criticism	  by	  both	  the	  field	  research	  fundamentalists,	  who	  think	  she	  tends	  to	  become	  ungrounded	  when	  she	  ventures	  into	  theory,	  and	  by	  the	  macro-­‐theorists,	  who	  believe	  her	  fieldwork	  to	  be	  nothing	  more	  than	  wallowing	  in	  lowly	  detail.	  To	  best	  understand	  her	  struggles,	  analysis	  of	  Governing	  the	  Commons’	  method	  and	  academic	  reception	  and	  is	  in	  order.	  
Governing	  the	  Commons	  
At	  216	  pages,	  Governing	  the	  Commons	  affords	  the	  reader	  ample	  time	  to	  consider	  the	  basic	  question.	  Ostrom	  pauses	  many	  times	  within	  its	  first	  few	  chapters	  in	  order	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Frank R. Baumgartner is Richard J. Richardson Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 2	  Margaret Levi is the L. Bacharach Professor of International Studies at the University of Washington and is the 
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address	  what	  the	  book	  will	  not	  be.	  This	  appears	  to	  be	  her	  classic	  dilemma.	  In	  carving	  out	  her	  famous	  political-­‐economic	  middle	  ground,	  she	  experiences	  separation	  anxieties.	  Many	  academics	  lay	  claim	  to	  her	  arguments	  where	  no	  connection	  should	  be	  found.	  Simultaneously,	  many	  academics	  disown	  her	  findings,	  claiming	  they	  should	  not	  be	  labeled	  as	  their	  own.	  	  
Governing	  the	  Commons	  served	  as	  the	  backbone	  to	  Ostrom’s	  body	  of	  work.	  As	  Professor	  Margaret	  Levi2	  states,	  “Governing	  the	  Commons	  significantly	  advances	  the	  analysis	  of	  collective	  action,	  institutions,	  and	  local	  power.	  It	  is	  also	  innovative	  in	  its	  combination	  of	  theory	  and	  fieldwork”	  (Levi	  573).	  Professor	  Nancy	  Bermeo3	  defends	  Ostrom	  further,	  saying	  “[Lin’s]	  goal	  is	  clearly	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  practical	  and	  realistic	  framework	  for	  policymaking”	  (Bermeo	  570).	  
GTC’s	  Reception	  Over	  Its	  Life	  
Governing	  the	  Commons	  has	  received	  varied	  attention	  over	  the	  course	  of	  its	  life.	  Published	  in	  1990,	  the	  book	  .	  Moreover,	  in	  that	  time,	  interest	  in	  its	  findings,	  as	  measured	  by	  citations	  per	  year,	  increased	  steadily.	  As	  Prof.	  Robert	  Axelrod4	  notes,	  “it	  is	  interesting	  that	  after	  being	  published	  in	  1990,	  Governing	  the	  Commons	  caught	  on	  slowly”	  (Axelrod	  581).	  	  He	  adds,	  “Rather	  than	  following	  the	  common	  pattern	  of	  tapering	  off	  after	  a	  few	  years,	  the	  book	  actually	  had	  three	  times	  as	  many	  citations	  in	  its	  second	  decade	  of	  publication	  as	  in	  its	  first	  decade.“	  (Axelrod	  581).	  However,	  Bermeo	  advocates	  that	  among	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Margaret Levi is the L. Bacharach Professor of International Studies at the University of Washington and is the 
Chair in Politics at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. 3	  Nancy Bermeo - Nancy Bermeo is professor of comparative politics at the University of Oxford. 4	  Robert Axelrod is the Walgreen Professor for the Study of Human Understanding at the University of Michigan. 
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students	  of	  politics,	  “this	  study	  has	  certainly	  found	  a	  broad	  and	  appreciative	  readership	  in	  general”	  (Bermeo	  570).	  	  
	  
Governing	  the	  Commons’	  (hereafter	  referred	  to	  as	  GTC)	  positive	  trajectory	  in	  annual	  citations,	  resembling	  the	  snowball	  effect,	  has	  been	  rationalized	  by	  many	  observers.	  Firstly,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  academic	  climate	  present	  before,	  during,	  and	  after	  its	  publishing.	  Before	  GTC,	  Garrett	  Hardin	  dominated	  discourse	  relating	  to	  the	  commons.	  While	  it	  was	  not	  his	  explicit	  intention	  to	  create	  discussion	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  most	  economists	  were	  happy	  to	  let	  it	  reside	  within	  the	  murky	  gray	  area	  of	  ecology	  that	  the	  Californian	  had	  created	  by	  his	  archaic	  citations	  and	  dramatic	  writing.	  Ostrom	  certainly	  suffered	  due	  to	  her	  perceived	  association	  with	  Hardin’s	  “Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons.”	  As	  a	  result,	  she	  often	  attempted	  to	  place	  herself	  at	  an	  arm’s	  length	  in	  
Governing	  the	  Commons.	  For	  instance,	  early	  in	  the	  text	  she	  observed,	  “much	  that	  had	  been	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written	  about	  common-­‐pool	  resources,	  however,	  had	  uncritically	  accepted	  the	  earlier	  models	  and	  the	  presumption	  of	  remorseless	  tragedy”	  (Ostrom	  7).	  She	  continued	  distancing	  herself,	  at	  times	  proceeding	  in	  an	  appalled	  fashion.	  When	  discussing	  Hardin’s	  work,	  she	  remarks	  that	  “scholars	  have	  gone	  so	  far	  as	  to	  recommend	  that	  Hardin’s	  ‘Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons”	  should	  be	  required	  reading	  for	  all	  students....	  And,	  if	  [the	  reviewer]	  had	  it	  [his]	  way,	  for	  all	  human	  beings”	  (Ostrom	  7).	  She	  then	  moves	  to	  say	  that	  those	  who	  follow	  Hardin’s	  logic	  “achieved	  little	  more	  than	  a	  metaphorical	  use	  of	  the	  models”	  (Ostrom	  7).	  However,	  no	  matter	  how	  thoroughly	  Ostrom	  proved	  the	  fundamental	  differences	  between	  Hardin	  and	  herself,	  his	  image	  would	  remain	  attached	  to	  hers.	  In	  fact,	  even	  after	  her	  acceptance	  of	  the	  Nobel	  Prize,	  New	  York	  Times	  columnist	  John	  Tierney	  said	  her	  reception	  of	  the	  prize	  “is	  a	  useful	  reminder	  of	  how	  easy	  it	  is	  for	  scientists	  to	  go	  wrong,	  especially	  when	  their	  mistake	  jibes	  with	  popular	  beliefs	  or	  political	  agendas”	  (Tierney,	  NYTimes.com).	  He	  chastises	  Ostrom	  for	  attaching	  herself	  to	  Hardin’s	  “buzzword,”	  that	  word	  being	  “commons,”	  before	  moving	  on	  to	  solely	  (and	  weakly)	  critique	  the	  crux	  of	  Hardin’s	  points,	  not	  Ostrom’s.	  It	  appears	  John	  Tierney	  did	  not	  take	  the	  time	  to	  understand	  the	  fundamental	  differences	  in	  their	  work.	  Yet,	  sadly,	  to	  the	  average	  New	  York	  Times	  reader,	  Ostrom	  appears	  wholly	  unfit	  to	  have	  won	  the	  Nobel	  Prize.	  	  Having	  Hardin’s	  work	  be	  recommended	  to	  be	  read	  “by	  all	  human	  beings”	  must	  have	  been	  difficult	  to	  digest	  for	  Ostrom,	  given	  that	  her	  own	  work	  was	  only	  slowly	  given	  recognition.	  Part	  of	  the	  issue	  with	  GTC’s	  immediate	  reception	  was	  the	  base	  of	  reviewers	  was	  uncertain.	  Bermeo	  notes	  “most	  of	  its	  reviews	  were	  in	  public	  policy	  and	  economics	  journals.	  Most	  of	  its	  reviewers	  were	  economists	  or	  public	  policy	  specialists,	  and	  most	  of	  the	  major	  journals	  of	  the	  subfield	  (most	  notably	  World	  Politics	  and	  Comparative	  Politics)	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failed	  to	  review	  the	  book	  at	  all”	  (Bermeo	  570).	  Bermeo	  later	  remarked	  “Governing	  the	  
Commons	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  modern	  "canon"	  in	  the	  subfield	  of	  comparative	  politics.	  This	  is	  both	  an	  awkward	  truth	  and	  an	  unfortunate	  one,	  because	  Elinor	  Ostrom's	  study	  offers	  comparativists	  of	  all	  sorts	  a	  long	  list	  of	  insights	  on	  a	  range	  of	  core	  issues”	  (Bermeo	  570).	  Of	  course,	  Professor	  Bermeo	  was	  remarking	  in	  2010,	  the	  year	  after	  Ostrom	  won	  the	  Nobel	  Prize.	  Whether	  or	  not	  Bermeo,	  among	  other	  later	  reviewers,	  should	  be	  considered	  a	  bandwagon	  fan	  is	  not	  important.	  What	  it	  important	  is	  understanding	  Hardin’s	  negative	  effect	  on	  reception	  of	  Ostrom’s	  work	  on	  the	  commons,	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  intentionally	  and	  directly	  created	  a	  barrier.	  
Governing	  the	  Commons’	  reception	  was	  not	  solely	  affected	  by	  Hardin’s	  precedent.	  Its	  initial	  reviews	  were	  scattered.	  Since	  its	  Nobel	  recognition,	  a	  handful	  of	  academics	  have	  theorized	  why	  its	  reception	  was	  so	  uneven.	  Rationalizations	  of	  its	  initial	  weak	  reception	  range	  in	  technicality,	  with	  the	  least	  technical	  reasoning	  being	  offered	  by	  Prof.	  Robert	  Axelrod.	  During	  his	  review	  of	  the	  book,	  he	  speculates	  that	  “perhaps	  this	  was	  due	  in	  part	  to	  what	  William	  Mitchell	  decades	  ago	  described	  as	  Elinor	  Ostrom's	  "gentle,	  inconspicuous	  and	  unassuming	  manner"	  (Mitchell	  1988).	  To	  a	  student	  of	  Ostrom,	  his	  description	  is	  both	  as	  infuriating	  as	  it	  is	  ignorant.	  In	  219	  pages,	  Governing	  the	  Commons	  rarely	  presents	  emotion,	  personality,	  or	  “an	  unassuming	  manner.”	  GTC	  is	  a	  work	  of	  primary	  research,	  scientific	  modeling,	  and	  policy	  analysis.	  This	  explanation	  is	  almost	  certainly	  rooted	  in	  Elinor	  Ostrom’s	  physical	  appearance.	  This	  explanation	  carries	  with	  it	  implicit	  gender	  bias.	  	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	  further	  review	  the	  limiting	  factors	  to	  Governing	  the	  Commons’	  reception	  in	  detail.	  Ostrom	  herself	  directly	  recognizes	  these	  issues,	  whether	  in	  text	  or	  in	  interview.	  In	  2010,	  she	  stated	  “I	  think	  for	  many	  years	  [Governing	  the	  Commons]	  was	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ignored	  because	  it	  did	  not	  come	  up	  with	  an	  idealized	  plan.	  Policymakers	  wanted	  to	  know	  ‘‘the’’	  important	  way	  of	  solving	  something”	  (May	  34).	  
Ostrom	  versus	  Hardin	  
In	  critiquing	  Garrett	  Hardin,	  one	  risks	  being	  dragged	  down	  to	  his	  level,	  for	  indeed,	  as	  Axelrod	  argues	  “Ostrom's	  contribution	  was	  made	  possible	  by	  her	  refraining	  from	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  ‘tragedy	  of	  the	  commons’”	  (Axelrod	  580).	  Moreover,	  many	  of	  Hardin’s	  direct	  combatants	  in	  the	  debate	  were	  game	  theorists.	  Ostrom	  was	  neither	  Hardin	  nor	  a	  game	  theorist	  in	  true	  fashion.	  This	  often	  led	  both	  sides	  –	  Hardin’s	  acolytes	  on	  one	  end,	  game	  theorists	  on	  another	  -­‐	  to	  view	  her	  as	  their	  personal	  opponent.	  	  Ostrom’s	  disassociation	  from	  Hardin	  hinged	  on	  disproving	  the	  inevitability	  of	  Hardin’s	  tragedy	  by	  advocating	  for	  the	  rationality	  of	  individual	  actors.	  She	  did	  so	  many	  times	  over	  in	  a	  very	  deft	  fashion.	  Many	  attribute	  her	  solid	  arguments	  to	  her	  extensive	  fieldwork	  throughout	  the	  entirety	  of	  her	  career.	  Prof.	  Peregine	  Schwartz-­‐Shea5	  writes	  that	  Ostrom,	  “having	  watched	  people	  solving	  their	  own	  problems	  early	  in	  her	  career,”	  was	  “neither	  satisfied	  with	  the	  portrait	  of	  ‘helplessness’	  in	  Hardin's	  tragedy	  of	  the	  commons	  nor	  seduced	  by	  the	  parsimonious	  elegance	  of	  game	  theoretic	  models”	  (Schwartz-­‐Shea	  588).	  Many	  reviewers	  of	  GTC	  seemed	  to	  picture	  Ostrom	  set	  directly	  against	  Hardin.	  This	  was	  obviously	  not	  the	  case,	  as	  there	  is	  no	  record	  of	  their	  direct	  debate	  in	  public	  nor	  private.	  While	  they	  both	  acknowledge	  one	  another,	  with	  Ostrom	  mentioning	  Hardin	  many	  times	  over,	  they	  never	  truly	  were	  set	  against	  one	  another.	  Despite	  this	  fact,	  Professor	  Robert	  Axelrod	  calls	  their	  differences	  of	  opinions	  a	  “famous	  debate”	  (Axelrod	  580).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Peregrine Schwartz-Shea is professor of political science at the University of Utah. 
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While	  Axelrod’s	  labeling	  of	  the	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  their	  works	  as	  a	  “debate”	  extends	  the	  connotation	  that	  Ostrom	  had	  long	  sought	  to	  avoid,	  he	  does	  provide	  interesting	  perspective	  into	  their	  differences	  of	  opinions.	  He	  argues,	  “The	  alternatives	  were	  framed	  as	  private	  property	  vs.	  central	  authority[...]	  But	  Ostrom's	  observations	  in	  real	  world	  settings	  such	  as	  inshore	  fishing	  and	  allocation	  of	  irrigation	  water	  showed	  that	  repeated	  interactions	  among	  the	  users	  of	  a	  common	  resource	  often	  allowed	  them	  to	  build	  institutions	  that	  could	  provide	  effective	  monitoring	  and	  discipline	  of	  free	  riders,	  thereby	  achieving	  efficient	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  the	  resource”	  (Axelrod	  580).	  Communities	  have	  organically	  found	  best	  practices	  in	  their	  resource	  management,	  a	  fact	  that	  Ostrom	  maintained	  faith	  in	  despite	  many	  critiques.	  This	  faith	  and	  sensitivity	  to	  the	  individual	  actors’	  experience	  within	  local	  systems	  separated	  Ostrom	  from	  Hardin.	  It	  gave	  her	  an	  important	  perspective	  that	  was	  new	  to	  the	  political-­‐economics	  field	  as	  a	  whole.	  As	  Prof.	  Robert	  O.	  Keohane6	  said,	  “creative	  political	  science	  is	  not	  principally	  about	  applying	  new	  techniques,	  whether	  borrowed	  from	  economics,	  statistics,	  or	  other	  branches	  of	  our	  own	  field,	  to	  old	  problems.	  More	  fundamental	  innovations	  involve	  thinking	  in	  new	  ways	  about	  problems	  that	  have	  stumped	  former	  generations.	  Ostrom	  has	  thought	  in	  new	  ways	  about	  politics,	  institutions,	  and	  cooperation	  under	  nonhierarchical	  conditions“	  (Keohane	  578).	  This	  new	  way	  of	  thinking	  is	  best	  defined	  by	  Professor	  Peregrine	  Schwartz-­‐Shea	  as	  “fieldwork	  sensibility.”	  As	  Schwartz-­‐Shea	  elaborates,	  “[Ostrom’s]	  field	  experiences	  made	  her	  question	  Garrett	  Hardin's	  (1968)	  presumption	  that	  individuals	  are	  ‘trapped’	  and	  ‘helpless’.”	  (Schwartz-­‐Shea	  588).	  The	  Tragedy	  of	  Commons	  does	  not	  acknowledge	  how	  fundamental	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Robert O. Keohane is professor of international affairs at Princeton University. 
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differences	  in	  decision	  making	  humans	  can	  affect	  specific	  outcomes.	  In	  fact,	  Hardin	  neither	  cares	  to	  examine	  possible	  differences	  in	  collective	  action	  problems	  nor	  cares	  to	  discuss	  the	  rationality	  of	  human	  decision	  makers.	  Hardin	  remains	  intentionally	  high	  level.	  Solely	  relying	  on	  universal	  solutions	  and	  theories	  is	  likely	  a	  result	  of	  his	  scientific	  background.	  Yet,	  it	  seems	  wholly	  inconsistent	  with	  his	  endorsement	  of	  scientific	  method	  in	  his	  biology	  textbooks.	  Ostrom’s	  tangible	  attunement	  with	  the	  real	  community	  decision	  makers	  allowed	  her	  to	  view	  the	  true	  contexts	  of	  the	  larger	  game	  theory	  being	  played	  out.	  	  For	  instance,	  in	  her	  first	  research	  stint	  in	  graduate	  school,	  she	  examined	  local	  water	  distributions	  around	  Los	  Angeles,	  California.	  Ostrom	  took	  initiative	  to	  investigate	  a	  community	  outlier	  in	  water	  usage,	  the	  city	  of	  Hawthorne	  where	  “the	  city	  continued	  to	  pump	  more	  water	  than	  it	  had	  been	  allotted	  under	  the	  agreement,	  saving	  itself	  money	  and	  spreading	  those	  costs	  across	  other	  users"	  (Schwartz-­‐Shea	  587).	  While	  many	  game	  theorists	  would	  have	  drawn	  their	  conclusions	  about	  Hawthorne’s	  inability	  to	  participate	  in	  its	  contractual	  obligation,	  Ostrom	  personally	  went	  to	  Hawthorne’s	  decision	  makers.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  city’s	  leaders,	  the	  problem	  appeared	  to	  be	  multilayered.	  Ostrom	  writes,	  “Hawthorne	  viewed	  its	  needs	  to	  serve	  a	  municipality	  with	  water	  as	  superior	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  industry	  in	  the	  area”	  (Ostrom	  120).	  Ostrom	  “revealed	  that	  for	  city	  leaders,	  ‘the	  problem’	  was	  not	  the	  threat	  to	  the	  common-­‐pool	  resource,	  but	  whether	  public	  water	  resources	  should	  be	  diverted	  to	  private,	  industry	  use“	  (Schwartz-­‐Shea	  587).	  The	  town	  thought	  the	  water	  was	  better	  used	  for	  their	  residents	  than	  to	  be	  monetized	  by	  corporate	  interests.	  Lin	  Ostrom	  proved	  to	  herself	  and	  to	  her	  research	  colleagues	  that	  collective	  action	  problems	  can	  be	  better	  analyzed	  by	  understanding	  decision	  makers’	  perspective	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Hawthorne.	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Fundamental	  differences	  between	  the	  findings	  in	  “Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons”	  and	  
Governing	  the	  Commons	  originated	  from	  the	  earliest	  academic	  days	  of	  Garrett	  Hardin	  and	  Elinor	  Ostrom.	  Simultaneously,	  Ostrom	  distinguished	  her	  work	  from	  traditional	  game	  theorists	  through	  her	  fieldwork,	  for	  “these	  continued	  field	  experiences	  sensitized	  her	  to	  the	  need	  for	  time-­‐	  and	  place-­‐specific	  information	  and	  to	  the	  costs	  of	  acquiring	  such	  information	  made	  her	  question	  the	  simplicity	  of	  standard	  game-­‐theoretic	  and	  economic	  models	  with	  their	  assumptions	  of	  perfect	  information”	  (Schwartz-­‐Shea	  587).	  Assumptions	  against	  perfect	  information	  took	  many	  forms.	  For	  instance,	  she	  refused	  to	  "assume	  bureaucrats	  are	  always	  budget-­‐maximizers"	  (Schwartz-­‐Shea	  587).	  This	  attitude	  is	  a	  more	  specific	  reflection	  of	  her	  overarching	  view	  that	  one	  should	  seek	  to	  understand	  and	  to	  be	  understood	  deeply.	  As	  Prof.	  May	  states,	  Ostrom’s	  “insights	  [are]	  often	  at	  odds	  with	  views	  of	  human	  nature	  inherent	  in	  much	  of	  economic	  theory”	  (May	  1).	  Ostrom	  also	  took	  issue	  with	  Hardin’s	  dramatic	  tone.	  She	  believed	  that	  Hardin	  allowed	  his	  vision	  of	  the	  impending	  tragedy	  to	  transcend	  the	  importance	  of	  his	  technical	  argument.	  	  As	  Prof.	  Bermeo	  posited,	  “whether	  a	  crisis	  exists	  or	  not,	  those	  who	  wish	  to	  implement	  rapid	  institutional	  change	  have	  incentives	  to	  use	  the	  language	  of	  crisis”	  (Bermeo	  571).	  	  Ostrom	  supported	  this	  assertion,	  saying	  people	  like	  Hardin	  tend	  to	  “weight	  potential	  losses	  more	  heavily	  than	  potential	  gains"	  while	  studying	  collective	  action	  problems	  (Ostrom	  208).	  His	  appeal	  to	  disaster	  was	  a	  marketing	  advantage	  of	  “The	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons.”	  Prof.	  Bermeo	  believes	  that	  because	  he	  framed	  his	  theory	  as	  a	  “means	  of	  avoiding	  imminent	  disaster,	  [he]	  takes	  advantage	  of	  this	  differential	  weighting“	  (Bermeo	  571).	  Ostrom	  shows	  us	  she	  is	  able	  to	  exercise	  her	  aforementioned	  “even-­‐handed”	  approach	  by	  maintaining	  an	  even-­‐headed	  calm	  during	  her	  research.	  Her	  aspects	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of	  differentiation	  from	  Hardin	  ultimately	  contributed	  to	  scholarship	  	  worthy	  of	  receiving	  the	  Nobel	  Prize	  in	  Economics.	  	  
Nobel	  Prize	  in	  Economics	  Ostrom’s	  acceptance	  of	  the	  Nobel	  Prize	  should	  have	  represented	  a	  victory	  for	  the	  field	  of	  political-­‐economics,	  the	  idea	  of	  “the	  commons,”	  and	  for	  women	  in	  academia.	  In	  many	  ways,	  it	  did.	  The	  award	  was	  a	  pure	  and	  formal	  acknowledgement	  of	  political-­‐economics	  inclusion	  under	  the	  economics	  umbrella.	  To	  Ostrom,	  the	  prize	  represented	  an	  exciting	  newfound	  platform	  to	  market	  her	  findings	  to	  both	  economists	  and	  the	  general	  public.	  Governing	  the	  Commons	  was	  set	  to	  become	  part	  of	  the	  economics’	  “canon”	  of	  must-­‐read,	  field-­‐changing	  works.	  However,	  the	  award	  failed	  to	  yield	  the	  aforementioned	  results	  to	  the	  magnitude	  Ostrom	  and	  many	  other	  female	  academics	  would	  have	  thought.	  The	  prize’s	  effect	  is	  best	  summarized	  by	  Prof.	  Jane	  Mansbridge	  when	  she	  writes	  that	  “when	  the	  Nobel	  Committee	  awarded	  Ostrom	  the	  2009	  Prize	  in	  Economics,	  it	  might	  have	  drawn	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  general	  public	  to	  this	  problem,”	  yet	  it	  failed	  to	  achieve	  even	  wide	  readership	  in	  the	  economic	  academia	  (Mansbridge	  591).	  In	  many	  ways,	  reactions	  to	  the	  announcement	  parallel	  reactions	  Ostrom	  had	  been	  receiving	  over	  the	  course	  of	  her	  life.	  There	  was	  distaste	  for	  the	  media’s	  acknowledgement	  of	  her	  gender.	  There	  was	  a	  continued	  focus	  on	  her	  “debate”	  with	  Garrett	  Hardin.	  There	  was	  reinforcement	  of	  her	  exclusion	  from	  traditional	  economics.	  The	  Nobel	  prize	  did	  not	  change	  Lin	  Ostrom’s	  problems	  so	  much	  as	  it	  highlighted	  them.	  Women	  have	  been	  historically	  underrepresented	  within	  the	  ranks	  of	  Nobel	  Laureates.	  For	  instance,	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  and	  the	  three	  other	  women	  in	  her	  2009	  class,	  brought	  the	  total	  number	  of	  female	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Nobel	  Laureates	  to	  17	  which	  “represents	  only	  2.8%	  of	  the	  membership	  of	  this	  exclusive	  club”	  (“2009	  Nobels:	  Break	  or	  Breakthrough	  for	  Women?”,	  656).	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  Ostrom	  was	  the	  first	  woman	  to	  win	  the	  award	  in	  Economics.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  award	  surprised	  many	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Economics,	  who	  believed	  the	  award	  belonged	  to	  a	  more	  conventional	  work	  and	  author.	  Professor	  Ben	  Fine7	  speculates	  that	  “apart	  from	  those	  working	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  on	  institutional	  or	  environmental	  economics,	  she	  would	  have	  been	  known	  to	  few	  economists	  [at	  the	  time	  she	  received	  her	  Nobel	  Prize]”	  (Fine	  583).	  It	  appears	  that	  Ostrom	  was	  the	  minority	  in	  receiving	  the	  award	  in	  two	  different	  ways,	  both	  in	  gender	  and	  traditional	  economic	  circles.	  This	  point	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  observers,	  particularly	  academics	  who	  believed	  her	  work	  was	  not	  purely	  economic	  enough	  to	  merit	  the	  award.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  Nobel	  committee’s	  description	  of	  the	  award	  was	  irresolute	  in	  its	  defense	  of	  her	  work’s	  rightful	  place.	  When	  describing	  their	  reasoning,	  the	  committee	  seemed	  to	  hedge	  their	  admonishment	  of	  her	  work.	  The	  committee	  has	  received	  small	  amount	  of	  criticism	  about	  taking	  a	  “narrow	  view,”	  that	  appeared	  to	  be	  “designed	  to	  explain	  its	  choice	  to	  an	  audience	  of	  economists”	  (Mansbridge	  591).	  This	  specifically	  took	  away	  from	  the	  larger	  potential	  “to	  educate	  the	  public	  on	  the	  broader	  dynamic	  of	  free-­‐rider	  problems.”	  	  Moreover,	  they	  failed	  to	  market	  the	  massive	  benefit	  educating	  the	  public	  could	  provide,	  “a	  dynamic	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  end	  life	  as	  we	  know	  it”(Mansbridge	  591).	  The	  idiosyncratic	  nature	  of	  Ostrom	  being	  awarded	  a	  Nobel	  prize	  in	  Economics	  is	  important	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  It	  is	  unfair	  to	  say	  the	  reception	  was	  wholly	  negative.	  University	  of	  London	  Economics	  professor	  Ben	  Fine	  acknowledged	  this	  “idiosyncratic	  nature,”	  but	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maintains	  that	  “her	  work	  clearly	  has	  had	  an	  impact	  sufficient	  to	  merit	  the	  prize”	  (Fine	  583).	  He	  continued,	  calling	  the	  award	  “somewhat	  paradoxical.”	  He	  ultimately	  presents	  a	  defense	  of	  both	  Ostrom’s	  arguments	  and	  the	  committee’s	  selection,	  saying	  Governing	  the	  
Commons	  is	  “so	  attractive	  to	  at	  least	  some	  economists,	  even	  though	  that	  work	  would	  seem	  far	  from	  the	  economics	  mainstream”	  (Fine	  583).	  	  In	  giving	  Ostrom	  the	  award,	  the	  committee	  understood	  its	  opportunity	  to	  redefine	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  award,	  reshaping	  the	  way	  economists	  must	  look	  at	  their	  specialty.	  Ostrom	  was	  perfect	  candidate	  to	  bring	  the	  field	  of	  economics	  into	  the	  21st	  century,	  able	  to	  represent	  change	  through	  her	  hybrid	  analysis	  and	  gender.	  Professor	  Ben	  Fine	  echoes	  this	  sentiment,	  saying	  her	  work	  “reflects,	  modifies,	  and	  yet	  reproduces	  the	  colonization8	  of	  the	  other	  social	  sciences	  by	  economics”	  (Fine	  583).	  Unfortunately,	  the	  Nobel	  Prize	  echoed	  issues	  of	  gender	  and	  traditional	  economic	  politics	  that	  had	  been	  present	  in	  Ostrom’s	  career.	  After	  receiving	  the	  award,	  the	  ensuing	  discussion	  centered	  around	  her	  academic	  findings	  as	  well	  as	  her	  gender	  and	  “debate”	  with	  Garrett	  Hardin.	  	  
Hardin’s	  Relation	  to	  Ostrom’s	  Institutional	  Struggles	  -­‐	  Gender	  &	  Traditional	  
Economics	  
In	  many	  ways,	  Garrett	  Hardin	  exacerbated	  Elinor	  Ostrom’s	  lifelong	  struggles.	  To	  Elinor	  Ostrom,	  he	  represented	  the	  dominating,	  unbridled	  male	  voice	  present	  within	  academic	  discourse,	  able	  to	  speak	  before	  thinking.	  To	  traditional	  economists,	  Hardin	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Professor	  Ben	  Fine	  comments	  immediately	  after	  his	  aforementioned	  quote,	  saying	  “such	  talk	  of	  ‘colonization’	  would	  no	  doubt	  be	  rejected	  by	  Ostrom”	  (Fine	  583).	  This	  highlights	  the	  unaggressive	  manner	  Ostrom	  must	  have	  carried	  herself.	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represented	  a	  clear	  separation	  of	  the	  traditional	  study	  of	  economics	  from	  the	  “commons.”	  	  	  
Gender	  Struggles	  
Ostrom’s	  barriers	  to	  entry	  began	  in	  her	  childhood	  years.	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  experienced	  gender-­‐related	  hindrances	  and	  criticisms	  at	  nearly	  every	  critical	  point	  of	  her	  life,	  starting	  as	  early	  as	  her	  high	  school	  counseling,	  where	  “she	  was	  discouraged	  from	  enrolling	  in	  calculus,	  which	  kept	  her	  from	  taking	  further	  math	  courses	  as	  an	  undergraduate”	  (May	  2).	  Her	  lack	  of	  calculus	  experience	  affected	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  her	  career.	  As	  Ostrom	  said	  in	  2009,	  “I	  think	  that	  the	  presumption	  that	  women	  did	  not	  have	  good	  mathematical	  skills	  is	  what	  kept	  many	  women	  out	  of	  the	  discipline	  of	  economics”	  (May	  32).	  Her	  lack	  of	  calculus	  would	  affect	  the	  rest	  of	  her	  higher	  education.	  She	  continued,	  saying	  “when	  I	  applied	  for	  graduate	  school	  to	  both	  the	  economics	  and	  political	  science	  departments	  at	  UCLA,	  I	  was	  rapidly	  turned	  down	  by	  the	  economics	  department	  because	  I	  did	  not	  have	  mathematics	  in	  my	  undergraduate	  training.	  That	  went	  all	  the	  way	  back	  to	  high	  school	  counseling”	  (May	  32).	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  two	  Indiana	  University	  reporters	  on	  the	  day	  she	  received	  her	  Nobel	  Prize,	  Ostrom	  acknowledged	  struggles	  she	  faced	  due	  to	  her	  gender,	  saying	  “there	  was	  no	  encouragement	  to	  think	  about	  anything	  other	  than	  teaching	  in	  high	  school	  or	  being	  pregnant	  and	  barefoot	  in	  the	  kitchen’’	  (Brad	  Zehr	  and	  Biz	  Carson	  2009).	  She	  has	  since	  participated	  in	  multiple	  interviews,	  many	  of	  which	  probed	  into	  Ostrom’s	  views	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  her	  award	  for	  women,	  her	  trials	  as	  a	  woman,	  and	  her	  views	  on	  the	  future	  for	  women	  in	  economics.	  While	  she	  voluntarily	  submits	  herself	  to	  questioning	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about	  gender,	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  only	  acknowledges	  gender	  when	  asked.	  Often	  times,	  she	  diverts	  the	  interviewer	  to	  a	  more	  academic	  discussion	  about	  her	  research	  findings.	  Ostrom	  seemed	  to	  be	  committed	  to	  her	  ideas	  more	  than	  to	  retelling	  the	  story	  of	  her	  life,	  itself.	  But,	  women	  within	  the	  field	  of	  economics,	  like	  many	  other	  fields	  of	  academic	  studies,	  number	  few.	  May	  notes	  “[Ostrom]	  	  received	  her	  doctorate	  in	  1965	  at	  a	  time	  when	  only	  about	  12	  percent	  of	  doctorates	  in	  political	  science	  (and	  4	  percent	  of	  doctorates	  in	  economics)	  were	  awarded	  to	  women”	  (May	  31).	  This	  fact	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  Ostrom.	  Her	  Nobel	  class	  of	  2009,	  featuring	  four	  women,	  singlehandedly	  raised	  the	  percentage	  number	  of	  women	  recipients	  by	  31%.	  Whereas,	  before	  2009,	  “gender	  as	  a	  category	  of	  analysis	  in	  economics	  has	  historically	  been	  either	  absent	  or	  underdeveloped”	  (May	  and	  Sommerfield	  30).	  	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  received	  her	  first	  teaching	  job	  at	  Indiana	  by	  remaining	  prepared	  and	  awaiting	  opportunity.	  Her	  husband,	  Vincent,	  had	  already	  been	  on	  the	  staff	  and	  had	  been	  sure	  to	  monitor	  job	  openings.	  	  Ostrom	  recounts	  that	  Indiana	  University	  “eventually	  needed	  someone	  to	  teach	  an	  undergraduate	  course	  on	  American	  government	  on	  Tuesday,	  Thursday,	  and	  Saturday	  mornings,	  and	  I	  was	  willing	  to	  do	  this.”	  (May	  32).	  The	  hiring	  of	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  made	  by	  IU	  completely	  in	  respect	  to	  administrative	  convenience.	  	  Ostrom,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  dodges	  questions	  about	  gender,	  often	  redirecting	  questions	  towards	  her	  research	  work.	  For	  instance,	  in	  an	  interview	  with	  Prof.	  May	  in	  2011,	  May	  points	  out	  the	  Workshop’s	  disproportionate	  number	  of	  women	  given	  the	  general	  graduate	  students	  percentage	  of	  women.	  Ostrom	  replied	  with	  surprise	  in	  short	  fashion,	  remarking	  “I	  had	  not	  known	  the	  picture	  showed	  a	  disproportionate	  number	  of	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women	  in	  the	  1970s,	  but	  now	  as	  I	  am	  thinking	  about	  it,	  I	  am	  not	  too	  surprised.	  Since	  we	  have	  not	  made	  decisions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  gender,	  women	  have	  had	  a	  good	  opportunity	  to	  be	  active	  participants	  at	  the	  Workshop”	  (May	  33).	  	  Ostrom’s	  dedication	  to	  her	  research	  affected	  her	  life	  in	  many	  ways.	  Notably,	  Ostrom	  elected	  not	  to	  have	  a	  family	  with	  her	  husband.	  She	  openly	  discussed	  this	  fact,	  saying	  “I	  made	  the	  decision	  not	  to	  have	  a	  family	  because,	  in	  earlier	  times,	  that	  would	  have	  been	  a	  very,	  very	  difficult	  thing	  to	  accomplish“	  and	  “as	  a	  somewhat	  older	  participant,	  I	  had	  a	  clear	  [choice]”	  (2009	  Interviews	  of	  Women	  Nobel	  Prize	  recipients	  657).	  	  This	  ultimate	  dedication	  led	  to	  her	  eventual	  success.	  However,	  many	  women	  who	  began	  graduate	  programs	  within	  political	  science	  or	  economics	  failed	  to	  complete	  their	  degrees	  due	  gender-­‐related	  discouragement.	  Ostrom	  specifically	  recounts	  a	  former	  colleague’s	  troubles	  in	  an	  interview	  saying	  “I	  do	  know	  a	  bit	  about	  the	  career	  of	  one	  other	  woman	  graduate	  student	  who	  was	  in	  my	  entry	  class.	  She	  did	  become	  so	  depressed	  over	  academic	  problems	  that	  she	  took	  a	  draft	  of	  her	  dissertation	  and	  burned	  it	  and	  moved	  out	  of	  academia	  entirely”	  (Ostrom	  to	  May,	  32).	  This	  fact	  further	  highlights	  Ostrom’s	  perseverance.	  
Traditional	  Economics	  
Economics,	  in	  this	  instance,	  refers	  to	  the	  community	  of	  people	  who	  consider	  themselves	  to	  actively	  research,	  teach,	  study,	  and	  publish	  on	  the	  field	  of	  economics.	  This	  small,	  male-­‐dominated	  community	  is	  particularly	  protective	  of	  the	  right	  to	  consider	  oneself	  “an	  economist,”	  as	  if	  the	  title	  is	  as	  definite	  as	  the	  designation	  “M.D.”	  Professor	  Ben	  Fine	  attributes	  this	  territorial	  behavior	  as	  the	  culprit	  responsible	  for	  “an	  extraordinary	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ignorance	  to	  alternative	  schools	  of	  economics,”	  especially	  “relative	  to	  other	  social	  sciences”	  (Fine	  583).	  This	  “extraordinary	  ignorance”	  appears	  to	  be	  intentional,	  evidenced	  by	  the	  academic	  reaction	  upon	  Elinor	  Ostrom’s	  acceptance	  of	  the	  Nobel	  Prize.	  The	  reactions	  to	  Ostrom’s	  Governing	  the	  Commons	  often	  include	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  examples	  pointing	  to	  Ostrom’s	  anti-­‐economic-­‐ness.	  	  Professor	  Peregrine	  Schwartz-­‐Shea	  does	  an	  incredible	  job	  summarizing	  underlying	  and	  “intertwined	  tensions”	  in	  Ostrom’s	  research:	  A	  tension	  between	  the	  universalizing	  assumptions	  of	  the	  rational-­‐actor	  model	  and	  her	  desire	  to	  understand	  the	  perspectives	  of	  actors	  in	  the	  field;	  a	  tension	  between	  her	  preference	  for	  self	  organizing	  systems	  and	  her	  policy-­‐analytic	  role	  of	  advising	  governmental	  and	  other	  decision	  makers;	  and	  a	  tension	  between	  her	  advocacy	  for	  a	  ‘general	  framework’	  (or	  ‘behavioral	  approach’)	  for	  researchers	  and	  her	  critique	  of	  ‘universal	  solutions.’(Schwartz-­‐Shea	  589)	  	   These	  tensions	  create	  holes	  to	  attack	  for	  many	  economist-­‐detractors.	  However,	  Ostrom	  views	  her	  own	  existence	  within	  these	  tensions	  as	  intrinsically	  important	  to	  her	  research.	  She	  has	  not	  fallen	  into	  the	  fray	  of	  these	  tensions	  so	  much	  as	  she	  strived	  to	  enter	  them.	  They	  are	  new	  academic	  territory.	  She	  writes	  that	  "relying	  entirely	  on	  models	  to	  provide	  the	  foundation	  for	  policy	  analysis"	  leads	  scholars	  to	  "presume	  that	  they	  are	  omniscient	  observers,	  able	  to	  comprehend	  the	  essentials	  of	  how	  complex,	  dynamic	  systems	  work	  by	  creating	  stylized	  descriptions	  of	  some	  aspects	  of	  those	  systems"	  (Ostrom	  215).	  In	  this	  particular	  instance,	  she	  proposes	  her	  “fieldwork	  sensibility”	  as	  a	  humbling	  feature.	  Sensitivity	  to	  the	  mindset	  of	  the	  actors	  in	  her	  case	  studies	  is	  not	  as	  un-­‐
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mathematical	  as	  it	  is	  a	  display	  of	  humility	  and	  a	  realistic	  assumption	  about	  the	  extent	  of	  her	  abilities.	  This	  willingness	  to	  exist	  in	  these	  tensions	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  fundamentally	  different	  conclusions	  is	  inherently	  backwards	  to	  many	  people	  in	  the	  strict	  and	  orderly	  field	  of	  economics.	  Ostrom	  navigates	  the	  gray	  area	  with	  ease	  unique	  to	  her.	  “Not	  only	  is	  she	  comfortable	  with	  the	  ambiguity	  and	  messiness	  associated	  with	  how	  institutions	  evolve	  over	  time,	  but	  she	  can	  also	  handle	  herself	  in	  a	  fight”	  contends	  Professor	  Frank	  R.	  Baumgartner	  of	  UNC	  Chapel	  Hill	  (Baumgartner	  575).	  This	  ability	  and	  willingness	  to	  embrace	  “messiness”	  allowed	  her	  work	  to	  transcend	  one	  particular	  academic	  silo,	  such	  as	  economics.	  Her	  work	  is	  incredibly	  malleable.	  It	  has	  been	  referenced	  in	  property	  damage	  litigation,	  environmental	  pollution	  studies,	  police	  organization	  hierarchy	  studies,	  and	  many	  other	  fields.	  Ostrom’s	  work	  is	  sometimes	  characterized	  as	  “middle-­‐range	  theory,	  suspended	  somewhere	  between	  the	  individual	  and	  society[...]	  and	  between	  minutiae	  and	  grand	  historical	  and	  social	  issues”	  (Fine	  583).	  	  Ostrom’s	  views	  of	  common-­‐pool	  resources	  and	  ‘the	  commons’	  extend	  not	  only	  to	  how	  she	  grouped	  units	  within	  her	  literal	  research,	  but	  also	  extends	  to	  how	  she	  views	  academic	  research	  as	  an	  entity.	  Ostrom	  has	  even	  gone	  so	  far	  as	  to	  suggest	  “a	  broadening	  [of]	  criteria	  for	  tenure,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  United	  States”	  because	  “our	  tenure	  system	  encourages	  some	  scholars	  to	  think	  of	  only	  their	  individual	  silo	  and	  not	  the	  meadow”	  (May	  29).	  Interestingly,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  disconnect	  among	  	  reviewers	  of	  Governing	  of	  
Commons	  as	  to	  whether	  Ostrom	  infiltrated	  economics	  or	  if	  economics	  infiltrated	  Ostrom.	  As	  often	  as	  Lin	  Ostrom	  is	  criticized	  for	  commandeering	  the	  economics	  name,	  economics	  is	  said	  to	  perform	  “economic	  imperialism”	  (Fine	  583).	  Economists	  themselves	  have	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disagreed	  whether	  they	  infringe	  on	  other	  social	  studies	  or	  if	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  infringed	  on	  their	  territory.	  Some	  contemporaries	  understood	  Ostrom’s	  hybrid	  method	  to	  be	  a	  result	  of	  her	  research	  question.	  Prof.	  Baumgartner	  says	  “she	  picked	  perhaps	  the	  biggest	  issue	  of	  her	  day,	  the	  relation	  between	  states	  and	  markets	  and	  she	  came	  firmly	  to	  a	  conclusion	  no	  one	  liked:	  Neither	  should	  be	  trusted	  alone”	  (Baumgartner	  575).	  This	  focus	  allowed	  her	  to	  focus	  on	  a	  “set	  of	  concerns	  had	  the	  consequence	  of	  placing	  her	  work	  in	  the	  crosshairs	  of	  an	  ideological	  divide	  as	  powerful	  as	  any	  in	  modern	  politics”	  (Baumgartner	  575).	  Often	  times,	  especially	  within	  print	  news	  coverage,	  economists	  benefit	  from	  Lin	  Ostrom’s	  associations	  with	  Garrett	  Hardin.	  Many	  understand	  the	  origination	  of	  ‘the	  commons’	  in	  the	  journal	  Science	  by	  a	  “crazed”	  ecologist	  to	  still	  be	  adequate	  reason	  to	  disown	  the	  later	  works	  of	  Elinor	  Ostrom.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  the	  year	  of	  Ostrom’s	  award,	  columnist	  John	  Tierney	  states	  “the	  2009	  Nobel	  Prize	  for	  economics	  is	  a	  useful	  reminder	  of	  how	  easy	  it	  is	  for	  scientists	  to	  go	  wrong,	  especially	  when	  their	  mistake	  jibes	  with	  popular	  beliefs	  or	  political	  agendas”	  before	  immediately	  critiquing	  the	  arguments	  presented	  in	  Garrett	  Hardin’s	  essay	  “The	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons.”	  (Tierney,	  "The	  Non-­‐Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons").	  Ostrom	  reached	  academic	  fame,	  even	  attaining	  salience	  through	  a	  famous	  attributable	  quote	  –	  also	  known	  as	  Ostrom’s	  law	  -­‐	  “a	  resource	  arrangement	  that	  works	  in	  practice	  can	  work	  in	  theory.”	  Even	  this,	  her	  famous	  quote,	  contains	  subtle	  recognition	  and	  chastising	  of	  her	  peers,	  such	  as	  Garrett	  Hardin	  or	  game	  theorists,	  who	  do	  not	  have	  her	  fieldwork	  sensibility.	  
Application	  Potentials	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Ostrom’s	  focus	  was	  on	  common-­‐pool	  resources.	  However,	  applications	  of	  her	  work	  range	  tremendously.	  The	  Workshop	  she	  founded	  at	  Indiana	  University	  continues	  to	  carry	  her	  work	  forward,	  funding	  both	  graduate	  work	  and	  PhD	  work	  in	  fields	  concerning	  governance.	  Many	  reviewers	  of	  Governing	  the	  Commons	  have	  found	  their	  own	  use	  for	  her	  findings.	  	  Professor	  Keohane	  rescaled	  her	  work	  to	  apply	  to	  planet	  earth,	  the	  same	  scale	  by	  which	  Garrett	  Hardin	  had	  viewed	  the	  commons.	  He	  did	  so	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  it	  for	  environmental	  impact,	  reflecting	  his	  belief	  that	  “all	  life	  depends	  on	  a	  larger	  commons:	  the	  earth	  and	  its	  atmosphere“(Keohane	  577).	  Environmental	  regulation	  has	  become	  more	  front-­‐of-­‐mind	  since	  her	  publishing	  of	  Governing	  the	  Commons	  in	  1990,	  making	  her	  book	  more	  relevant	  throughout	  the	  years.	  When	  Ostrom	  wrote	  her	  great	  work,	  “human	  beings	  were	  unaware	  of	  the	  dangers	  to	  the	  atmosphere	  posed	  by	  climate	  change;	  most	  of	  us	  now	  have	  been	  exposed	  to	  the	  enormous	  amount	  of	  evidence	  indicating	  that	  the	  earth's	  atmosphere	  is	  becoming	  warmer	  as	  a	  result	  of	  human	  emissions	  of	  carbon	  dioxide	  and	  other	  greenhouse	  gasses”	  (Keohane	  577).	  Keohane	  believes	  there	  exists	  a	  “malady	  of	  underprovision/overuse”	  that	  equally	  “afflicts	  the	  traditional	  village	  commons	  and	  the	  earth's	  atmosphere”	  (Keohane	  578).	  Furthermore,	  Keohane	  believes	  employing	  the	  commons	  is	  the	  most	  appropriate	  way	  to	  study	  stateless	  terror	  units.	  He	  particularly	  points	  to	  stateless	  Islamic	  terrorism’s	  effect	  on	  non-­‐radical	  Muslims	  can	  be	  better	  understood	  by	  viewing	  the	  problem	  through	  a	  “commons	  outlook.”	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  majority,	  non-­‐radical	  population	  of	  Muslim	  people	  around	  the	  world	  are	  suffering	  instability	  of	  reputation	  and,	  often	  times,	  of	  regional	  peace	  due	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  only	  a	  few.	  National	  security	  analysts,	  in	  assessing	  threats	  remote	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and	  stateless	  threats,	  could	  also	  benefit	  from	  analysis	  using	  a	  commons	  outlook.	  Clearly,	  the	  traditional	  method	  is	  failing	  to	  adequately	  interpret	  threats	  and	  cultural	  groupings.	  Professor	  Schultz	  makes	  use	  of	  the	  commons	  to	  analyze	  American	  business’s	  environmental	  impact.	  In	  order	  to	  shift	  the	  underlying	  way	  in	  which	  resource	  usage	  is	  examined	  from	  the	  current,	  traditionally	  economic	  model,	  to	  the	  commons	  requires	  private	  business	  to	  shift	  as	  well.	  Prof.	  Schultz	  examines	  “the	  extent	  which	  business	  activities,	  marketing	  plans,	  and	  consumer	  products	  are	  commons-­‐friendly,	  that	  is,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  work	  toward	  sustaining	  commonly	  shared	  natural	  resources”	  (Schultz	  1).	  She	  follows	  by	  calling	  for	  “a	  synthesis	  for	  analysis	  of	  commons-­‐	  related	  problems	  as	  a	  guide	  to	  action	  encouraging	  their	  resolution”	  between	  business	  interests,	  the	  resource	  extractors,	  and	  the	  social	  scientists	  (Schultz	  1).	  Prof.	  Schultz	  believes	  in	  applying	  the	  research	  in	  the	  most	  realistic	  fashion,	  thus	  she	  set	  her	  sights	  on	  private	  business	  enterprises	  who	  control	  supply	  and	  demand	  of	  resources	  in	  the	  modern	  economy.	  	  	  Professor	  Dennis	  Axelrod	  believes	  viewing	  the	  internet	  as	  the	  commons	  could	  lend	  itself	  to	  a	  more	  profound	  understanding	  of	  how	  to	  regulate	  it.	  In	  this	  instance,	  he	  particularly	  focuses	  on	  “cyber	  riots,”	  otherwise	  known	  as	  DDoS	  attacks,	  made	  famous	  by	  hacking	  groups	  such	  as	  Anonymous	  (Axelrod	  582).	  	  Ostrom’s	  work	  has	  even	  applied	  to	  humankind’s	  next	  great	  frontier,	  outer	  space.	  	  Governments	  around	  the	  world	  are	  currently	  “pursuing	  policy	  initiatives	  that	  they	  hope	  will	  help	  them	  achieve	  the	  long-­‐term	  sustainability	  of	  the	  space	  environment	  and	  humanity’s	  activities	  in	  space”	  (T.	  Chow).	  By	  viewing	  space	  as	  a	  commons	  and	  “applying	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previous	  scholarly	  research	  to	  this	  discussion,	  policy	  makers	  can	  gain	  insight	  into	  possible	  ways	  forward	  in	  their	  pursuit	  of	  space	  sustainability”	  (T.	  Chow).	  	  
Ostrom’s	  Contribution	  to	  World	  Politics	  	   Although	  Ostrom	  clearly	  focuses	  on	  local	  issues,	  in	  lieu	  of	  examining	  national	  or	  international	  units,	  she	  still	  contributed	  to	  world	  politics.	  Her	  work	  is	  inherently	  critical	  of	  “many	  interventions	  from	  national	  and	  regional	  authorities	  as	  interfering	  with	  locally	  organized	  cooperation”	  (Keohane	  577).	  Ostrom	  does	  so	  without	  directly	  using	  anything	  other	  than	  small	  communities	  for	  her	  case	  studies.	  Despite	  her	  intentional	  distancing	  from	  global	  organizations,	  Professor	  Keohane	  believes	  Governing	  the	  Commons	  “is	  potentially	  an	  important	  contribution	  to	  the	  study	  of	  world	  politics”	  (Keohane	  577).	  	  
Personality:	  Charisma,	  Inclusivity	  	   Struggles	  in	  the	  forms	  of	  gender	  bias	  and	  economic	  territorialism	  did	  not	  dissuade	  Ostrom	  so	  much	  as	  they	  spurred	  her	  onto	  greatness	  and	  inclusivity.	  Her	  findings	  are	  acclaimed	  as	  much	  as	  her	  process.	  One	  specific	  instance	  of	  her	  push	  towards	  inclusivity	  of	  gender	  and	  disciplines	  is	  her	  founding	  of	  the	  Workshop	  for	  Political	  Theory	  and	  Policy	  Analysis	  with	  her	  husband,	  Vincent,	  in	  1973.	  Many	  former	  research	  associates,	  assistants,	  and	  colleagues	  corroborate	  this	  by	  speaking	  extremely	  highly	  of	  her.	  Ostrom’s	  positivity	  is	  most	  often	  noted	  in	  her	  interpersonal	  interactions,	  not	  in	  her	  writing.	  Upon	  reading	  many	  of	  her	  works,	  it	  was	  evident	  that	  she	  maintained	  a	  strictly	  academic	  tone	  so	  as	  to	  avoid	  any	  possible	  criticism.	  	  However,	  analysis	  of	  Ostrom’s	  findings	  suggest	  she	  had	  an	  incredible	  trust	  and	  belief	  in	  humans’	  decision	  making	  and	  problem	  solving.	  She	  believes	  that	  “the	  costs	  of	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centralization”	  is	  directly	  related	  to	  “people's	  capacities	  for	  self-­‐	  government”	  (Bermeo	  571).	  “It	  can	  and	  will	  be	  read	  in	  many	  ways,	  but	  I	  read	  it	  primarily	  as	  a	  celebration	  of	  human	  capability.	  Though	  its	  celebratory	  message	  is	  certainly	  muted	  by	  both	  the	  abstract	  language	  of	  game	  theory	  and	  the	  author's	  wholly	  unsentimental	  approach	  to	  her	  research	  question,	  the	  study	  provides	  a	  vivid	  parade	  of	  evidence	  showing	  that	  the	  problem-­‐solving	  capability	  of	  ordinary	  people	  has	  been	  underestimated	  by	  social	  scientists	  and	  policymakers	  alike“	  (Bermeo	  571).	  
Interdisciplinary	  
Political	  economics,	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  is	  cross-­‐disciplinary.	  This	  is	  reflected	  in	  many	  reviews	  of	  GTC.	  Prof.	  Dennis	  Axelrod	  specifically	  calls	  GTC	  “an	  outstanding	  example	  of	  interdisciplinary	  research,	  and	  a	  particular	  example	  of	  how	  much	  the	  discipline	  of	  political	  science	  has	  to	  offer	  other	  disciplines”	  (Axelrod	  580).	  The	  goal	  of	  Ostrom’s	  overall	  work	  is	  “twofold:	  to	  advance	  the	  field	  but	  also	  to	  stimulate	  the	  work	  of	  others”	  (Levi	  573).	  	  One	  example	  is	  given	  by	  Prof.	  Margaret	  Levi,	  who	  says	  Ostrom	  “pushed	  for	  better	  research	  on	  the	  role	  of	  trust	  and	  reciprocity	  in	  social	  order”	  (May	  2).	  May	  also	  says	  that	  Ostrom’s	  participation	  in	  the	  Russell	  Sage	  Foundation	  Trust	  project	  shows	  how	  she	  “explored	  these	  issues	  collaboratively	  through	  workshops	  and	  an	  edited	  volume	  of	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  experimental	  findings”	  (Levi	  573).	  Ostrom’s	  vision	  was	  to	  “emphasize	  cooperation	  over	  competition,	  embrace	  transdisciplinary	  approaches,	  and	  encourage	  methodological	  pluralism”	  (May	  2).	  
Conclusion	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Elinor	  Ostrom	  achieved	  much	  more	  than	  her	  Nobel	  Prize.	  Ostrom	  overcame	  a	  myriad	  of	  struggles,	  both	  small	  and	  large.	  She	  combined	  successfully	  combined	  “her	  feet-­‐on	  the-­‐ground	  observations”	  with	  “the	  heads-­‐in-­‐the-­‐clouds	  theorizing”	  to	  create	  a	  “transforming	  effect	  on	  both	  practical	  communities	  seeking	  answers	  to	  complicated	  problems	  and	  on	  intellectual	  communities	  with	  their	  own	  serious	  fault	  lines”	  (Baumgartner	  577).	  Ostrom	  and	  Hardin	  developed	  reputations	  as	  some	  of	  the	  most	  incredibly	  decorated,	  dedicated,	  and	  influential	  thinkers	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  Both	  intellectuals	  played	  a	  part	  in	  steering	  the	  local,	  national,	  and	  global	  conversation	  about	  how	  humans	  manage	  one	  another	  and	  their	  resources,	  emphasizing	  the	  commons.	  They	  both	  found	  great	  importance	  in	  understanding	  the	  way	  humans	  interact	  within	  groups	  to	  better	  preserve	  and	  sustain	  life	  on	  earth.	  Although	  a	  casual	  observer	  would	  have	  difficulty	  understanding	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  together,	  these	  late	  professors	  differ	  vastly	  in	  their	  approaches	  to	  analyzing	  data	  and	  communicating	  their	  results.	  On	  one	  end	  of	  the	  thought	  spectrum	  sits	  Garrett	  Hardin,	  a	  “Taboo	  Slayer.”	  His	  grandiose	  premises,	  divisive	  solutions,	  and	  aggressive	  delivery	  transform	  his	  conversation	  with	  the	  reader	  into	  heated	  debate.	  His	  views	  on	  the	  world	  are	  at	  times	  theatrical,	  but	  never	  so	  ridiculous	  as	  to	  defy	  logic.	  On	  the	  opposite	  end	  sits	  Elinor	  Ostrom,	  who	  is	  remembered	  kindly	  for	  her	  “collaboration,	  contestation,	  and	  love”	  (Herzberg	  1).	  This	  dispositional	  difference	  is	  simply	  illustrated	  in	  the	  titles	  of	  their	  primary	  works	  –	  “The	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons”	  by	  Hardin	  versus	  Governing	  the	  Commons	  by	  Ostrom.	  The	  texts	  behind	  these	  titles	  further	  reveals	  the	  respective	  differences.	  Ostrom’s	  work	  is	  primarily	  technical	  -­‐	  full	  of	  models,	  game	  theory	  explanations,	  and	  case	  studies.	  However,	  the	  first	  chapter	  of	  the	  six	  that	  comprise	  Governing	  the	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Commons	  solely	  speaks	  directly	  to	  what	  GTC	  should	  not	  be	  mistaken	  as.	  The	  first	  chapter,	  titled	  “Reflections	  on	  the	  Commons,”	  specifically	  addresses	  and	  diffuses	  Hardin’s	  precedent.	  This	  nod	  towards	  Hardin	  is	  completely	  unreciprocated,	  Hardin	  hardly	  ever	  mentions	  an	  academic	  contemporary.	  The	  sheer	  presence	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  important	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  “Reflection	  on	  the	  Commons”	  demonstrates	  Ostrom’s	  battles	  and	  frustrations	  on	  multiple	  levels.	  First,	  it	  represents	  her	  struggle	  to	  carve	  a	  space	  for	  the	  legitimate	  study	  of	  Political	  Economy	  and	  Common-­‐pool	  Resources;	  she	  needed	  to	  speak	  to	  traditional	  economists.	  Her	  need	  to	  distance	  herself	  from	  Hardin	  in	  deliberate	  fashion,	  despite	  the	  wholly	  unique	  findings	  her	  book	  details	  with	  hundreds	  of	  pages,	  also	  speaks	  to	  a	  more	  casual,	  non-­‐specialist	  audience	  .	  The	  first	  23	  pages	  of	  Governing	  the	  Commons	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  complete	  and	  clear-­‐headed	  descriptions	  of	  the	  body	  of	  work	  pertaining	  to	  “the	  commons.”	  While	  Ostrom	  and	  Hardin	  differ	  on	  a	  myriad	  of	  other	  qualities	  and	  topics,	  reception	  of	  their	  life’s	  work	  varies	  considerably.	  Topically,	  Ostrom’s	  Nobel	  Prize	  legitimized	  both	  her	  work	  and	  the	  study	  of	  common-­‐pool	  resources.	  Before	  her	  award,	  the	  commons	  and	  common-­‐pool-­‐resources	  were	  the	  third	  party	  in	  a	  bipartisan	  academic	  system,	  left	  to	  jockey	  for	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  attention.	  As	  Clemson	  Professor	  Robert	  Tollison	  writes,	  “before	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  a	  commons	  was	  treated	  like	  the	  black	  hole	  of	  an	  economy”	  (Tollison	  325).	  Thinking	  about	  the	  commons	  was	  left	  for	  whimsical,	  zany,	  and	  crazed	  UC	  Santa	  Barbara	  professors	  to	  predict	  the	  end	  of	  the	  world,	  or	  in	  other	  words,	  Garrett	  Hardin.	  However,	  the	  results	  from	  the	  award	  have	  been	  underwhelming.	  Now	  that	  the	  commons	  has	  been	  lent	  proper	  support,	  it	  must	  be	  explored	  and	  understood.	  After	  all,	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despite	  their	  many	  differences,	  both	  academics	  agree	  there	  are	  implications	  of	  the	  commons	  that	  must	  be	  solved.	  A	  popular	  focus	  concerns	  the	  “population	  problem”	  and	  pollution.	  Thomas	  Malthus	  proposed	  the	  idea	  in	  1798,	  claiming	  	  geometric	  population	  growth	  would	  outpace	  arithmetically	  increasing	  food	  production.	  To	  this	  day,	  Malthus	  receives	  large	  amounts	  of	  ire	  from	  the	  academic	  community.	  Ostrom	  even	  begins	  Governing	  of	  the	  Commons	  by	  saying	  “hardly	  a	  week	  goes	  by	  without	  a	  major	  news	  story	  about	  the	  threatened	  destruction	  of	  a	  valuable	  natural	  resource”	  (Ostrom	  1).	  A	  great	  pool	  of	  knowledge	  and	  opinion	  between	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  (d.	  2012)	  and	  Garrett	  Hardin	  (d.	  2003)	  exists.	  However,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  each	  professor’s	  past,	  personality,	  and	  communication	  skills	  impacted	  proliferation	  of	  this	  new	  concept	  of	  “the	  commons.”	  In	  order	  to	  fully	  understand	  the	  commons,	  one	  must	  learn	  about	  the	  proponents	  of	  the	  concept.	  The	  “taboo”	  surrounding	  common-­‐pool	  resources’	  vagueness	  demanded	  highly	  motivated,	  exceptionally	  dedicated	  people	  to	  solve	  and	  communicate	  results.	  A	  look	  into	  the	  tales	  of	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  and	  Garrett	  Hardin	  is	  important	  to	  understanding	  their	  works,	  ideas,	  and	  influence.	  Utilizing	  audio	  and	  video	  of	  interviews	  online,	  reading	  numerous	  primary	  texts,	  and	  studying	  lecture	  transcripts	  maximize	  one’s	  understanding	  of	  each	  professor’s	  voice	  and	  personality.	  By	  conjoining	  two	  unique	  views	  gained	  through	  these	  studies,	  the	  obscurity	  of	  “The	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons”	  is	  made	  more	  transparent	  and	  digestible.	  	   Importantly,	  Ostrom	  took	  issue	  with	  Hardin	  for	  a	  different	  set	  of	  reasons	  than	  most.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  publication,	  she	  was	  concerning	  herself	  with	  a	  number	  of	  case	  studies	  pertaining	  to	  city	  water	  basins,	  police	  force	  hierarchies,	  and	  other	  institutions.	  Through	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her	  fieldwork,	  she	  gained	  appreciation	  for	  the	  multitude	  of	  factors	  that	  can	  create	  institutions	  and	  believed	  that	  Hardin’s	  base	  example,	  a	  British	  grazing	  field,	  was	  oversimplified	  and	  far	  from	  all	  encompassing.	  Ostrom	  never	  wished	  for	  Hardin’s	  metaphor	  to	  be	  relegated	  to	  little	  importance.	  She	  is	  quoted	  as	  saying,	  “if	  only	  the	  ‘commons’	  of	  importance	  were	  a	  few	  grazing	  fields	  or	  fisheries,	  the	  tragedy	  of	  commons	  would	  be	  of	  little	  general	  interest.	  That	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  (Ostrom,	  1990).	  However,	  despite	  their	  differences,	  Ostrom	  had	  a	  unique	  ability	  to	  remain	  respectfully	  skeptical,	  disseminating	  important	  points	  of	  Hardin’s	  work.	  	  This	  enabled	  her	  to	  include	  Hardin’s	  arguments	  within	  Governing	  the	  Commons	  as	  a	  benchmark	  in	  the	  timeline	  of	  her	  research.	  This	  is	  congruent	  with	  her	  lifelong	  attitude,	  “a	  foundation	  of	  teamwork,	  equality,	  and	  the	  deep	  personal	  regard	  for	  each	  other	  allows	  for	  intellectual	  debate,	  reflection,	  and	  change”	  (Herzberg	  265).	  Throughout	  her	  life,	  Ostrom	  demonstrated	  a	  love	  for	  teamwork	  within	  problem	  solving.	  She	  remained	  amiable	  “in	  contrast	  to	  the	  stereotype	  of	  elitist	  academics”	  by	  respecting	  “every	  person	  for	  what	  he	  or	  she	  contributed,	  not	  from	  an	  ideal,	  but	  from	  recognizing	  what	  worked”	  (Herzberg	  267).	  She	  believed	  implementation	  of	  a	  uniform	  system	  of	  research	  would	  link	  analysis	  by	  multiple	  disciplines	  of	  human	  economic	  interaction.	  This	  system	  would	  then	  serve	  as	  a	  standardized	  research	  metric	  that	  interested	  parties	  could	  use	  to	  share	  and	  build	  off	  of	  one	  another’s	  contributions.	  Her	  desire	  to	  continue	  amassing	  and	  analyzing	  case	  study	  data	  led	  to	  her	  founding	  of	  The	  Vincent	  and	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  Workshop	  in	  Political	  Theory	  and	  Policy	  Analysis.	  This	  organization	  continues	  collecting	  and	  synthesizing	  data	  to	  today	  due	  in	  large	  part	  to	  her	  donation	  of	  her	  Nobel	  winnings.	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Hardin,	  too,	  left	  the	  academic	  world	  better	  than	  he	  found	  it.	  As	  a	  teacher	  of	  biology	  early	  in	  his	  career,	  Hardin	  strived	  "to	  make	  the	  ideas	  of	  others	  clear,	  both	  to	  students	  and	  to	  the	  general	  public"	  (Bajema	  195).	  He	  did	  so	  by	  emphasizing	  critical	  thinking	  within	  science.	  After	  writing	  a	  textbook	  Biology:	  Its	  Human	  Implication	  in	  1962,	  he	  became	  a	  leader	  in	  popularizing	  teaching	  biology,	  among	  other	  sciences,	  through	  the	  scientific	  method.	  Hardin’s	  biology	  background	  also	  explains	  his	  admiration	  of	  natural	  selection	  and	  respect	  of	  tragedy,	  which	  he	  describes	  as	  “the	  solemnity	  of	  the	  remorseless	  working	  of	  things”	  (Hardin	  1244).	  However,	  Hardin’s	  umbrella	  theory	  and	  Ostrom’s	  building	  blocks	  of	  quantitative	  analysis	  both	  leverage	  a	  strong	  belief	  in	  game	  theory.	  Hardin	  believed	  a	  resolution	  to	  “The	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons”	  lay	  within	  educating	  each	  rational	  individual	  within	  the	  system	  to	  use	  critical	  thinking	  and	  to	  understand	  game	  theory.	  He	  cursed	  Adam	  Smith’s	  ‘invisible	  hand’	  saying	  that	  it	  contributed	  to	  “a	  dominant	  tendency	  of	  thought	  that	  has	  ever	  since	  interfered	  with	  positive	  action	  based	  on	  rational	  analysis,	  namely,	  the	  tendency	  to	  assume	  that	  decisions	  reached	  individually	  will,	  in	  fact,	  be	  the	  best	  decisions	  for	  an	  entire	  society”	  (Hardin	  1244).	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  phrases	  the	  same	  sentiments	  more	  clearly	  by	  saying	  “the	  paradox	  that	  individually	  rational	  strategies	  lead	  to	  collectively	  irrational	  outcomes	  seems	  to	  challenge	  a	  fundamental	  faith	  that	  rational	  human	  beings	  can	  achieve	  rational	  results”	  (Ostrom	  5).	  Elinor	  Ostrom’s	  life	  represented	  great	  change.	  Ostrom	  changed	  academics,	  especially	  in	  the	  field	  of	  economics.	  She	  did	  so	  through	  dedication	  to	  empirical	  research,	  faith	  in	  the	  rational	  actor,	  hard	  work.	  She	  did	  so	  in	  spite	  of	  gender	  barriers	  to	  entry	  into	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higher	  education.	  While	  Garrett	  Hardin	  became	  a	  thorn	  in	  Ostrom’s	  side,	  his	  presence	  ultimately	  pushed	  her	  toward	  and	  prepared	  her	  for	  greatness.	  	  	  No	  matter	  the	  degree	  of	  feasibility	  of	  their	  theories	  in	  practice,	  it	  is	  an	  undeniable	  fact	  that	  Hardin	  and	  Ostrom	  directed	  a	  major	  change	  in	  the	  economic	  conversation	  over	  the	  last	  century.	  By	  examining	  their	  ideas,	  personal	  lives,	  successes,	  and	  failures	  against	  one	  another,	  a	  greater	  awareness	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  commons	  was	  achieved.	  Elinor	  Ostrom’s	  contribution	  to	  academia	  was	  two-­‐fold.	  By	  establishing	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  commons	  and	  ensuring	  its	  endurance	  through	  her	  Workshop,	  she	  has	  provided	  a	  new	  means	  to	  examine	  and	  study	  humankind’s	  newest	  and	  greatest	  problems.	  Furthermore,	  by	  overcoming	  gender	  barriers	  throughout	  her	  career,	  she	  has	  opened	  the	  door	  to	  future	  women	  in	  the	  field	  of	  economics,	  political	  science,	  and	  political	  economy.	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   48	  
Works	  Cited	  Adler,	  Johnathan.	  "Property	  Rights	  and	  the	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons."	  The	  Atlantic.	  Atlantic	  Media	  Company,	  22	  May	  2012.	  Web.	  13	  Oct.	  2016.	  	  Bajema,	  Carl	  Jay.	  "Garrett	  James	  Hardin:	  Ecologist,	  Educator,	  Ethicist	  and	  Environmentalist."	  Population	  and	  Environment	  12.3	  (1991):	  193-­‐212.	  Web.	  	  Isaac,	  Jeffrey	  C.	  et	  al.	  “Beyond	  the	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons	  A	  Discussion	  of	  Governing	  the	  Commons:	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Institutions	  for	  Collective	  Action.”	  Including:	  Nancy	  Bermeo,	  Margaret	  Levi,	  Robert	  O.	  Keohane,	  Frank	  R.	  Baumgartner,	  Robert	  Axelrod,	  Ben	  Fine,	  Peregrine	  Schwartz-­‐Shea,	  Jane	  Mansbridge.	  Perspectives	  on	  Politics,	  vol.	  8,	  no.	  2,	  2010,	  pp.	  569–593.	  http://www.jstor.org/stable/25698619.	  	  Herzberg,	  Roberta,	  and	  Barbara	  Allen.	  “OBITUARY:	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  (1933—2012)”.	  Public	  	  
	   	   Choice	  153.3/4	  (2012):	  263–268.	   	  Hofmann,	  Klaus.	  "Beyond	  The	  Principle	  Of	  Population:	  Malthus's	  Essay."	  European	  Journal	  
Of	  The	  History	  Of	  Economic	  Thought	  20.3	  (2013):	  399-­‐425.	  Academic	  Search	  Complete.	  Web.	  13	  Oct.	  2016.	  	  Holden,	  Constance.	  “Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons'	  Author	  Dies.”	  Science,	  vol.	  302,	  no.	  5642,	  2003,	  pp.	  32–32.	  http://www.jstor.org/stable/3835249.	  	  Leeper,	  E.	  M.	  “A	  Chat	  with	  Garrett	  Hardin:	  Master	  of	  Metaphor	  Expands	  ‘Commons’	  Thesis.”	  BioScience,	  vol.	  26,	  no.	  12,	  1976,	  pp.	  785–787.	  www.jstor.org/stable/1297518.	  	  Lloyd,	  William	  Foster.	  “W.	  F.	  Lloyd	  on	  the	  Checks	  to	  Population.”	  Population	  and	  
Development	  Review,	  vol.	  6,	  no.	  3,	  1980,	  pp.	  473–496.	  www.jstor.org/stable/1972412.	  	  Malthus	  T.R.	  1798.	  An	  Essay	  on	  the	  Principle	  of	  Population,	  in	  Oxford	  World's	  Classics	  reprint.	  p	  61,	  end	  of	  Chapter	  VII	  	  May,	  Ann	  Mari,	  and	  Gale	  Summerfield.	  "Creating	  a	  Space	  Where	  Gender	  Matters:	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  (1933-­‐2012)	  Talks	  with	  Ann	  Mari	  May	  and	  Gale	  Summerfield."	  Feminist	  
Economics	  18.4	  (2012):	  25-­‐37.	  Web.	  	  Mitchell,	  William.	  1988.	  "Virginia,	  Rochester,	  and	  Bloomington:	  Twenty-­‐five	  years	  of	  Public	  Choice	  and	  Political	  Science."	  Public	  Choice	  56	  (2):	  101-­‐119.	  	  Myerson,	  Roger	  B.	  (1991).	  Game	  Theory:	  Analysis	  of	  Conflict,	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  p.	  1.	  Chapter-­‐preview	  links,	  pp.	  vii–xi.	  	  
	   49	  
“2009	  Nobels:	  Break	  or	  Breakthrough	  for	  Women?”	  Science,	  vol.	  326,	  no.	  5953,	  2009,	  pp.	  656–658.	  www.jstor.org/stable/40328509.	  	  Ostrom,	  Elinor.	  Governing	  the	  Commons:	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Institutions	  for	  Collective	  Action.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  UP,	  1990.	  Print.	  	  Radkau,	  Joachim.	  Nature	  and	  Power:	  A	  Global	  History	  of	  the	  Environment.	  Washington,	  D.C.:	  German	  Historical	  Institute,	  2008.	  Print.	  	  Shultz,	  Clifford	  J.,	  and	  Morris	  B.	  Holbrook.	  “Marketing	  and	  the	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons:	  A	  Synthesis,	  Commentary,	  and	  Analysis	  for	  Action.”	  Journal	  of	  Public	  Policy	  &Amp;	  
Marketing,	  vol.	  18,	  no.	  2,	  1999,	  pp.	  218–229.	  www.jstor.org/stable/30000542.	  	  Smith-­‐Gary,	  Laura.	  "Elinor	  Ostrom	  Awarded	  Nobel	  Prize	  for	  Economics."	  The	  Princeton	  
Climate	  Dispatch.	  N.p.,	  13	  Dec.	  2009.	  Web.	  3	  Oct.	  2016.	  	  Tierney,	  John.	  "The	  Non-­‐Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons."	  The	  New	  York	  Times.	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  15	  Oct.	  2009.	  Web.	  05	  Oct.	  2016. 	  Tollison,	  Robert	  D.	  “Elinor	  Ostrom	  and	  the	  Commons.”	  Public	  Choice,	  vol.	  143,	  no.	  3/4,	  	  	  	  	  2010,	  pp.	  325–326.	  www.jstor.org/stable/40661027.	  	  United	  Nations	  Secretariat,	  Department	  of	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Affairs,	  The	  World	  at	  Six	  
Billion	  (1999),	  p.8	  	  Chow,	  T.,	  and	  B.	  Weeden.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Ostrom’s	  Eight	  Principles	  for	  Sustainable	  
Governance	  of	  Common-­‐Pool	  Resources	  (n.d.):	  n.	  pag.	  Secure	  World	  Foundation.	  Web.	  	  Zehr,	  Brad	  and	  Biz	  Carson.	  2009.	  ‘‘Ostrom	  Becomes	  First	  Woman	  to	  Win	  Nobel	  Prize	  in	  Economics.’’	  Indiana	  Daily	  Student,	  October	  13.	  http://www.idsnews.com/news/	  NewStoryPrint.aspx?id.70924	  (accessed	  August	  2016).	  	  	  
